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Abstract
Since its establishment in 1992, NTT DoCoMo had accomplished rapid growth by
developing innovative strategies and meeting consumer demands. However, the population-
based penetration rate of Japanese wireless phones now exceeds 70%, and the market is
approaching saturation. Tariff reduction battles have occurred among competitors since the
introduction of flat rate packages in 2004. Furthermore, this competitive environment will
become even more fierce with the introduction of Mobile Number Portability and the
addition of new entrants
It is difficult for Japanese wireless telecom operators to achieve sustainable growth if
they continue to follow existing business models. DoCoMo therefore has begun to implement
a new business platform, 'Mobile Wallet' on which DoCoMo aims to build an unprecedented
business model-the fusion of its credit card and wireless phone businesses.
DoCoMo still generates a high level of cash flow from its existing businesses, even
though its growth rate has decelerated. In addition to the new strategy that has been
implemented for the domestic market, I believe DoCoMo should reinvest its abundant
investment resources effectively into markets with high growth potential in order to increase
the company's corporate growth.
In the past, DoCoMo acquired a minority stake in several wireless telecom operators
in developed countries for the purpose of expanding its W-CDMA and i-mode platforms
(developed by DoCoMo) but not for pursuing returns on its investment.
In contrast, Vodafone, DoCoMo's chief rival telecom operator, acquired a majority
stake in several wireless telecom operators in order to expand the scope and scale of its
business and to pursue synergy effects.
DoCoMo's present basic strategy can be defined as a technology-driven policy,
while Vodafone's basic strategy focuses on financial matters as afinance-driven policy. In
this thesis, I analyze the global strategies of these two wireless telecom operators, comparing
their respective technology-driven policy andfinance-driven policy. I present a philosophy
and methodology for a global investment strategy that will creates future sustainable growth
for DoCoMo. Finally, I examine specific investment candidates who could bolster the
implementation of the new strategy.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael A. Cusumano
Title: Sloan Management Review Professor of Management
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
NTT DoCoMo was spun off from NTT and began operation in July 1992, when the
population-based penetration rate of wireless phones in Japan was only around 1%. After
thirteen years, by September 2005, the number of wireless phone subscribers was 93.6
million and the penetration rate was 73.3%--close to saturation. DoCoMo's business has
expanded rapidly with the rapid growth of the wireless telecom market. DoCoMo's operating
revenue in FY 1993 was ¥574 billion, with a net income of Y3.8 billion, while FY 2004
revenues were Y4,845 billion and net income was -748 billion.
DoCoMo's growth in the Japanese wireless telecommunication market falls roughly
classified into three stages. The first stage was voice communication, from 1992 to 1998.
Voice communication led the expansion of the wireless phone market. The major
applications were voicemail and call forwarding. During this period, handsets became
smaller and lighter, and a drastic tariff reduction was implemented. These caused a dramatic
surge in demand for wireless phones.
The second stage was the wireless phone Internet period, from 1999 to 2003. In
February 1999, DoCoMo launched i-mode, its wireless phone Internet service, in Japan. i-
mode was the world's first service platform for e-mail and Web content through wireless
digital data communication. Three year after the launch, the number of i-mode subscribers
reached approximately 30 million, firmly entrenching DoCoMo at the top of the industry.
The third stage of growth began in 2004. Because the domestic market is close to
saturation and tariff reduction battles occur repeatedly among competitors, it is difficult for
DoCoMo to grow sustainably if they continue to follow the existing business model,
especially since introducing the flat rate package for 3G data transmission. In such a highly
competitive business environment, DoCoMo has begun to seek additional new revenue
sources through implementation of new business models such as Mobile Wallet. DoCoMo
aims to build an unprecedented business model in the wireless telecommunication industry
by fusing the credit card business with wireless phones-a business that will not depend on
existing telecommunication traffic business.
In this thesis I will propose a global investment strategy that establishes sustainable
future growth for DoCoMo while supporting its current strategies in the domestic market. I
believe that the concept of global investment, a strategy I will examine in this thesis, is
different from strategies executed by DoCoMo several years ago. In Chapter 2, I will analyze
the saturation of the wireless telecommunication market in Japan and the competitiveness of
the market, followed by a study of DoCoMo's current strategy-the fusion of the credit card
business with wireless phones. In Chapter 3, I examine DoCoMo's global strategies from a
historical basis, analyze the intent and problems of DoCoMo's global strategies during the
telecom bubble, and identify important considerations for DoCoMo's future global strategy.
In Chapter 4, I analyze Vodafone, which expanded its global footprint by means of several
M&As, and I examine the differences in global strategies between DoCoMo and Vodafone. I
identify within Vodafone's M&A strategy clues that will help DoCoMo develop its own
global investment strategy. In Chapter 5, I develop a philosophy for DoCoMo's global
investment strategy for sustainable growth, examine a methodology to translate that
philosophy into reality, and consider specific candidates for DoCoMo's future global strategy,
which I have proposed.
CHAPTER 2
The Wireless Telecommunication Industry in Japan
In this chapter, I will discuss recent trends in the wireless market in Japan, which has
led the wireless revolution with its explosive growth in the 1990s. Today, however, the speed
of that growth has slowed, and the market is reaching the saturation point. The slowdown
illustrates how quickly the wireless landscape can change. For regional operators in a highly
volatile industry, the effect of saturation is to slow revenue growth and squeeze profit
margins. Moreover, operators now face new threats such as mobile number portability and
new entrants to the market.
2.1 Structural Changes in Japan's Market
2.1.1 Market Saturation
The number of wireless phone subscribers in Japan was 93.6 million by the end of
September 2005, while the population-based penetration rate had reached 73.3%. The
penetration rate (excluding children and seniors) is around 80% in Japan. At the same time,
however, the number of new subscribers is slowing. It is uncommon in Japan to own more
than a handset because post-paid subscriptions are dominant, whereas pre-paid predominates
in Europe, which has a higher penetration rate. The subscription trend of the Japanese
cellphone market is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 Subscription trend of Japanese cellular phones market
While the growth rate has diminished somewhat after peaking in FY 2000, au Group
extended its share in FY 2004 by introducing a flat-rate package plan for 3G data
transmission and a high-speed music download service. This enabled au Group to realize an
increase in the number of younger-generation subscribers by offering new technologies
ahead of its competitors. On the other hand, the incumbent player, NTT DoCoMo Group,
gradually lost market share after FY 2000. However, the cancellation rate is decreasing as a
result of its discount tariff plan for families in FY 2004, and another new service, "Mobile
Wallet," is expected to increase demand in the future.
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2.1.2 Reasons for Low Growth in Wireless Telecom Business
2.1.2.1 Declining ARPU (Average Revenue per Unit)
The monthly profit per subscriber, known as average revenue per unit (ARPU), for
the major wireless telecom operators in Japan is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 ARPU of major Japanese wireless telecom operators
Because of its flat-rate packaged plan for 3G data transmission, and the expansion of
various tariff discount plans, the ARPU for each operator tends to decrease every year.
Recently au Group narrowed the difference between itself and DoCoMo, and the ARPU of
these two operators were virtually the same in FY 2004. In comparison, in 2003 the ARPU of
Japanese operators was almost twice that of the US$38 (OECD Communication Outlook,
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2005). It is clear that mobile Internet service continues to increase the ARPU. In the case of
DoCoMo, around 26% of ARPU comes from its mobile Internet service known as "i-mode."
2.1.2.2 Flat Rate Package for 3G Data Transmission
In November 2003, KDDI began offering "EZ Flat," a flat rate for Internet access to
its EZWeb service in Japan. Shortly thereafter, DoCoMo introduced the same flat-rate called
Pake-Hodai, in late June 2004, and Vodafone introduced "Packet Free" in November 2004.
Suddenly the mobile communication industry had rushed into the flat-rate era (see Table 2.1).
Carrier NTT DoCoMo Group au Group Vodafone Group
Service brand Pake-Hodai EZ flat (Double Flat Rates) Packet Free
Service start date June, 2004 November, 2003 November, 2004
Monthly chargeMonthly charge Y4,095 ¥1,050 - 4,410 Y1,050 - 4,095(Include tax)
Available
applications i-mode, E-mail EZ web, E-mail Vodafone live!, E-mailapplications
# of subscribers
(as of Dec. 2005) 4,450 6,750 N/A
Notes Except for data Except for data
transmission via PC transmission via PC
Source: Each operator providing data (2005)
Table 2.1 Flat rate packages for data transmission by Japanese operators
Before flat-rate packages were introduced, revenue from data was the cash cow in the
industry because voice revenue has been declining as a result of tariff discounts. As operators
can expect no more growth in their data revenue, each one is trying to develop a new
business model that will generate new revenue. For example, DoCoMo has developed its i-
mode FeliCa service, which generates new revenue that is not dependent on the existing
telecommunication traffic business. I will discuss this service in section 2-2.
2.1.2.3 NTT DoCoMo's Business Performance
In January 2006, DoCoMo disclosed its consolidated financial results for the nine
months from April 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005 (see Table 2-2).
------ ··-------·---
2004/4-12
(1Q',3Q) (1)
Operating Revenues 3,643.1
(Billions of yen)
Cellular Services Revenues
(Billions of yen)
Operating Income
(Billions of yen) 751
Income before income taxes 1,250.1(Billions of yen)
Net Income 756.5(Billions of yen)
EBITDA
(Billions of yen)
EBITDA Margin 35.8
Adjusted Free Cash Flows 845.4
(Billions of yen)
3,582.2
3,130.3
693.5
811.2
516.4
1,243.3
34.7
463.1
-1.7 %/
-0.0 %0/
-7.7 %/
-35.1%
-31.7 %/
-4.7 %/
-1.1 points
-45.2 %/
2006/3 E Progress to
(full-year)(3) forecast (2)/(3)(As anlo~ cd an Oct. 28, 2005)
4,784.0 74.9 %/
4,127.0 75.8 %
830.0 83.6 %I
942.05 86.1%/
604.0: 85.5 %
1,609.0 77.3 %o
33.6 -
..... 6 3 0 .0 7 3 .5............. ............ /  ..... ..
Source: NTT DoCoMo (2006)
Table 2.2 FY2005/3Q Financial Results Highlights
For the nine months ending December 31, 2005, operating revenue was Y3,582.2 billion
(down 1.7% compared to the same period of the prior year), operating income was Y693.5
14
billion (down 7.7% compared to the same period of the prior year), net income before
income taxes was Y811.2 billion (down 35.1% compared to the same period of the prior year),
and net income was V516.4 billion (down 31.7% compared to the same period of the prior
year).
DoCoMo also disclosed a tariff plan reduction, and it expanded its Pake Hoodai flat-
rate data program to all new service plans. Management is interested in retention and churn-
in effects as well as encouraging additional data usage among current low-volume users. Yet
this strategy could reduce ARPU for heavy data users to a level exceeding the positive
impacts in the short term. It is estimated that this will cost around Y40-50 billion in revenue
and profits annually. Some analysts such as Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, and Nomura are
worried about the next stage of tariff reduction battles with competitors. Mobile number
portability (MNP) is expected to result in new tariffs in November 2006, and new entrants
will be strong competitors in the market. Therefore the analysts reduced their investment
rating for DoCoMo.
Historical business performance data is shown in Table 2.3. An examination of the
operating revenue and EBITDA show that the core business performance is in a downward
trend and weakening earning power after peaking in FY 2003. It is clear that the flat-rate
package for 3G data service, and the tariff reductions are gradually affecting the overall
results. Moreover, as mentioned previously, APRU is rapidly and surely decreasing. On the
otter hand, DoCoMo still generates abundant cash flow from its business. However, it did not
use the cash efficiently after previous cross-border investments failed. In order to improve
its business performance, DoCoMo should develop investment policies and strategies that
will produce new revenue sources. I will discuss some of these options later.
(¥ billion)
Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (Est.)
Operating Revenue 4,178.1 4,659.3 4,809.1 5,048.1 4,844.6 4,784.0
Operating Income 778.6 1,000.9 1,056.7 1,102.9 784.2 830.0
Income before income taxes 758.1 956.4 1,043.0 1,101.1 1,288.8 942.0
Net income 401.8 (116.2) 212.5 650.0 747.6 604.0
EBITDA 1,425.3 1,680.6 1,836.3 1,859.9 1,625.7 1,609.0
EBITDA margin (%) 34.1% 36.1% 38.2% 36.8% 33.6% 33.6%
CAPEX 1,012.8 1,032.3 854.0 805.5 861.5 871.0
Free cash flow -1,886.4 216.0 713.2 862.9 603.3 630.0
ARPU (JPY/month) 8,680 8,470 8,130 7,890 7,200 6,770
Source: NTT DoCoMo
Table 2.3 NTT DoCoMo's historical financial data
2.1.3 New Competitive Environment
Within the Japanese wireless industry, extensive industry changes in the competitive
environment are called the "Year 2006 problem." They include two problems: Mobile
Number Portability, and "New entrants." It is possible that both of these issues will result in
squeezing the profit margins of incumbent operators.
2.1.3.1 Mobile Number Portability
In Japan, mobile number portability (MNP) will begin on November 1, 2006. MNP
means that every subscriber will be able to retain his/her unique wireless phone number, even
Introduction Availability Procedure Commission
time (No. of users) period (US$)
UK Jan-99 5% (2,510K) Original operator 15-25 days Max 52.8
+ New operator 2 days + iweek
Netherlands Jan-99 5% (600K) Original operator 3 biz days 10.9
+ New operator
Switzerland Jul-00 N/A New operator N/A Free
Spain Dec-00 1.6% (530K) N/A 5 days Free
Denmark Jul-01 11% (330K) New operator 30 days Free
Sweden Sep-01 5% (400K) New operator 5 biz days Free
Norway Nov-01 14.8% (590K) New operator 6.5 days 12.7
Italy May-02 1.6% (870K) N/A 30 days Free
Belgium Oct-02 2.2% (170K) New operator 2 days Max 18
Germany Nov-02 0.47% (270K) Original operator 4 days + 2 days
+ New operator
Ireland Nov-02 2.2% (66K) New operator Several hours Free
France Jun-03 0.1% (45K) Original operator
+ New operator
EU average Apr-02 2% (6,000K) 9 days 16.8
US Nov-03 N/A New operator 2.5 hours Max 1.75
Singapore Apr-97 N/A N/A N/A Charged --
Free
Hong Kong Mar-99 86.3% (5,780K) New operator 1-2 days Free -- 5.2
Australia Sep-01 8.6% (1,080K) New operator Several hours 6.0
South
Korea Jan-04 0.9% (300K) New operator 1 hours 1.1
Korea
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan (2005)
Table 2.4 Introduction of MNP in other countries
if that user changes to a different wireless service provider. Such a system has been
introduced in many other countries as another way to accelerate competition between
companies. The environment into which MNP is introduced varies significantly by country.
The key reason why users choose a carrier is "tariff." However, the cellphone tariff in
Japan may decline as operators institute tariff reductions as a way to retain customers. Price
cuts have already occurred three times in Hong Kong, both before and after MNP was
introduced, while the cost for wireless fell by about 10% in Australia. Wireless phone
operators in Japan cannot avoid reduced revenues and income unless they stop the price cuts
as a strategy for dealing with MNP.
Whether MNP succeeds or fails, judging from introductions that have already taken
place in other countries, the "procedure period" and the "commission" seem to be key. For
example, the availability of MNP in EU remains about 2% because the average procedure
period is as long as nine days. MNP availability in Hong Kong is 80% or more because there
was no commission fee in the beginning and the ten operators competed fiercely in that small
region.
A similar subscriber acquisition competition could intensify in Japan. It may be
possible that wireless telecom operators and their agencies will bear the costs/commissions
rather than shifting the costs to the users. In other countries, not only was there no
commission, but consumers were offered gifts as incentives to subscribe. For example, DVD
players were offered to new subscribers in Finland who moved from other operators.
Campaigns that offered high-priced commodities were implemented to attract new customers.
In Japan, MNP will be likely offered free of charge or very cheaply. The length of the
procedure period will be the key to the success or failure of MNP.
2.1.3.2 New Entrants
In September 2005, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan
disclosed that 1.7GHz spectrum and a part of 2.0GHz were available to new entrants in the
Japanese wireless telecom market. As a result, Softbank and E-access applied for the 1.7GHz
spectrum, and IP Mobile applied for the 2.0GHz spectrum. In November 2005, licenses were
delivered to these operators, and they began to prepare for wireless phone services (see Table
2.5)..
Soft Bank E-access IP Mobile(BB mobile) (E-mobile)
Spectrum band 1.7GHz 1.7GHz 2.0GHz
3G Method W-CDMA W-CDMA TD-CDMA
Service Launch Data Apr-07 Mar-07 Oct-06
Voice Dec-07 Feb-08 -
Target subscribers (million) 6.69 5.05 11.60
Source: Info-Sharing Business Institute (2006)
Table 2.5 Service Overview of the New Entrants
These operators wanted to enter the wireless market at this time not just to open new
spectrums but also to take advantage of MNP in November 2006. The launch of MNP offers
an excellent opportunity for new entrants to joint the market. If the new entries can be timed
with the introduction of MNP, they have great potential for acquiring more new customers.
The target of each new entrant is to acquire more than five million subscribers within
five years after it launches service. Naturally, that means depriving existing operators of
customers because the market is close to saturation.
2.2 Challenges in the Home Market for NTT DoCoMo
As explained in section 2.1, although the Japanese wireless market is becoming more
significant, DoCoMo's business performance has grown worse following the introduction of
the flat rate package for 3G transmissions in FY 2003. I believe 2003 was a turning point for
the Japanese wireless industry. Without exploring new markets, incumbent wireless operators
may lose opportunities for growth. For these reasons, DoCoMo has been developing a new
business model for creating new revenue sources. As one method of creating new markets,
DoCoMo is working to enhance the services it offers in its "brick-and-mortar" businesses
(see Figure 2.3). This is an entirely new business model in which the wireless phone, which
(1,000 subscribers) Became astandard feature
0 in n 11 aOn ,i k,hA
7,500
5,000
2,500
User
S"Ed)
i.E .j Laun(
No. of shops pr
payment servic
No. of vending
Edy keitai payn
(As of Jan. 1, 24
vxrjt LauncSuiCa
04/8 04/9 04/10 04/11 04/12 05/1 05/2 05/3 05/4 05/5 05/6 05/7 05/8 05/9 05/10 05/11 05/12
Source: NTT DoCoMo (2006)
Figure 2.3 Services linked with brick-and-mortar businesses
0
is close to saturation in Japan, evolves beyond the scope of voice and data communications to
become a useful tool in variety of daily life and business situations. DoCoMo refer to this
new business environment as "Wireless phone moving toward the third phase of growth," as
shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4 Wireless phones moving toward the third phase of growth
2.2.1 i-mode FeliCa (Mobile Wallet)
The key to DoCoMo's enhanced service is "Mobile Wallet," which is a wireless
phone equipped with a contactless IC chip (FeliCa). The concept behind mobile wallet is to
integrate the functions of the many cards normally in one's wallet, such as ID cards, credit
~lflllAM."At 'W"
cards, membership cards, room keys, and commuting passes/tickets. In place of the cards, the
wireless phone can perform a range of similar functions, including shopping. As of January
2006, the number of subscribers using wireless phones with Mobile Wallet had already
surpassed 10 million, while 26,000 shops were accepting Mobile Wallet.
Mobile Wallet is a new revenue source for DoCoMo, as well as lifestyle tool for
customers (see Figure 2.5), and it is likely to become an effective tool in the MNP period.
DoCoMo customers traditionally do not move to other operators, and this will be especially
true if they begin to fully utilize Mobile Wallet to store important personal information such
as ID cards and credit cards in their handsets. Mobile Wallet could be called the ultimate
enclosure for retaining customers.
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Figure 2.5 Creating a new "Lifestyle Infrastructure"
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DoCoMo established its FeliCa Networks Company in a joint venture with Sony in
January 2004. The joint venture develops a FeliCa IC chip that fuses FeliCa with the
functions of a cellphone. It also grants manufacturing and sales licenses to handset
manufacturers, develops and operates the FeliCa platform and provides the IC chip and the
platform to other wireless operators and content providers. If the FeliCa IC chip and
settlement platform are adopted by other wireless cellphone operators, a portion of the
license fee will be returned to DoCoMo, which is shareholder in FeliCa Networks. Wireless
handsets equipped with FeliCa have already been sold by au Group since September 2005,
and by Vodafone Group since November 2005.
2.2.2 Credit Card Business
In April 2005, DoCoMo entered into a strategic business and capital alliance with
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group and for Y98 billion acquired 34% of Sumitomo Mitsui
Card, the credit card arm of the financial group. Through this alliance, DoCoMo is now in a
position to create a credit payment platform for its Mobile Wallet service (see Figure 2.6),
with the goal of creating a new market for credit payments using wireless phones. DoCoMo
is working to expand the range of credit payments to include small sums that are now
typically paid in cash. This added platform enables DoCoMo to make further progress in
turning the wireless phone into part of the overall lifestyle infrastructure.
In December 2005, DoCoMo launched "iD", its new credit card that allows DoCoMo
customers to use Mobile Wallet to make payments. iD enhances DoCoMo's existing credit
card services by giving credit card owners the option of making payments through Mobile
Wallet linked to the card, in addition to conventional payments with their plastic credit cards.
Source: NTT DoCoMo (2005)
Figure 2.6 Mobile Wallet credit card payment service
The payment procedure is easy: simply wave the wireless phone in front of dedicated
reader/writers that are located in stores. No signature is required for purchases under a certain
amount, while purchases exceeding this amount require the user to enter a password via a
device linked to the reader/writer. In addition to enjoying secure payments with iD, DoCoMo
users also benefit from security features built into their Mobile Wallet. A user can, for
example, call a designated phone number to immediately lock a misplaced or stolen phone.
Also a user can choose to require a password for all payments. Applications for iD are
accepted through credit card issuers. Once the application is accepted, the user downloads an
i-appli application into their handset and chooses various settings to use the service.
In April 2006, DoCoMo launched DCMX consumer credit services via iD,
DoCoMo's brand and platform for mobile credit cards. Users of Mobile Wallet can choose
from two plans to make secure purchases in any amount using their mobile phones as a
DoCoMo-issued credit card. The "DCMX mini" offers a monthly credit line of Y10,000 and
payments are included with the user's monthly DoCoMo phone charges. There is no
membership fee to use this service. Customers can start using the service immediately after
applying through the DCMX i-mode site.
Credit lines from Y200,000, and cash advances, will be available in a separate service
also called DCMX. Purchases over Y10,000 require the customer to enter a four-digit
password. There is no membership fee during the first year, but in subsequent years a fee of
1 ,3 12 (including tax) will accrue if no transaction has taken place within 12 months.
Customers can apply for either type of credit line via the DCMX i-mode site or in writing.
Payments made via DCMX earn points that can be redeemed for discounts on products and
services from DoCoMo and other participating establishments. Users will also be issued
either a Visa or MasterCard card to make purchases at stores overseas, as well as at stores in
Japan that do not have iD reader/writers. Users under age 20 require a guardian's consent,
and must apply at a DoCoMo Shop, accompanied by a guardian.
Total credit card sales in Japan were approximately Y26.6 trillion in 2003 -
approximately 9% of total personal consumption in Japan, which is Y300 trillion. In the U.S.
credit card sales equal about 24% of total personal consumption. DoCoMo expects that credit
card sales will expand to Y50 trillion as the use of "iD" increases and will hold 10% of the
future market. With a commission of about 2%, revenue from the credit card business will be
Y100 billion. According to some of Japanese telecom analysts, if DoCoMo enters the
consumer cashing loan business, DoCoMo may be able to increase its net profit by around
Y100 billion in five to seven years.
2.2.3 Alliances to Promote Mobile Wallet and the Credit Card Business
DoCoMo has formed alliances with several companies in order to promote its Mobile
Wallet service and DoCoMo's iD credit card brand.
2.2.3.1 Alliance with UC Card and Mizuho Bank
In March 2006, DoCoMo entered into an agreement with UC Card and Mizuho Bank.
Under the agreement, Mizuho Bank transferred its stake in UC Card (approximately 18% of
UC Card's outstanding shares) to DoCoMo for about ¥1 billion. In addition, UC Card will
expand its acceptance of the iD brand at its network of participating stores nationwide. In
collaboration with DoCoMo, Mizuho Bank will upgrade the function of the Mizuho Mileage
Club (MMC) Card, an ATM card with credit card functions issued by Credit Saison. MMC
members are provided with the latest method of credit card payment via iD service through
their wireless phones. Going forward, the three companies will consider various ways to
enhance the collaboration:
* Mizuho and DoCoMo will collaborate at each other's place of business;
* Install iD-compatible readers at Mizuho ATMs;
* DoCoMo and Mizuho Bank will cooperate with each other's membership
programs;
* Develop settlement services for mobile phones;
* Develop mobile banking services for Mizuho Bank's high-end customers and
DoCoMo; and
* UC Card will work together to develop new businesses.
2.2.3.2 Alliance with LAWSON
In March 2006, DoCoMo entered into an agreement with LAWSON, one of the
largest Japanese convenience store chains. The business alliance will mean that customers
can use DoCoMo's Mobile Wallet for a variety of mobile services at LAWSON convenience
stores, such as making credit card payments or getting information about store promotions. In
addition, DoCoMo acquired 2,092,000 shares of LAWSON common stock owned by
LAWSON as treasury stock, or about 2% of total issued shares, for about Y9 billion. The
capital tie-up strengthens cooperation and facilitates faster development and implementation
of new services. The deals converge substantial business assets of the two companies,
namely DoCoMo's more than 50 million mobile phone subscribers and LAWSON's 8,300
convenience stores nationwide. The combination of brands, customer bases, know-how, and
experience will result in a variety of convenient, value-added services. Initially, about 100
LAWSON convenience stores introduced iD credit card payment service. The service will be
expanded to all LAWSON stores by the end of March 2007. Going forward, the two
companies will hold regular meetings to consider ways to enhance the collaboration, such as:
* Providing LAWSON club members with iD-linked Mobile Wallet services;
* Installing iD-compatible readers on ATMs in LAWSON stores;
* LAWSON stores providing administrative services for certain DoCoMo services;
* Developing store operations utilizing Mobile Wallet; and
* Utilizing both companies' resources to provide new services at LAWSON stores.
2.2.3.3 Alliance with Tower Record Japan
In November 2005, DoCoMo agreed with Tower Records Japan Inc. (TRJ) to form a
business alliance through a capital tie-up to jointly offer various DoCoMo phone services.
DoCoMo acquired an approximate 42% stake in TRJ for about ¥12.8 billion. The tie-up
enables TRJ and DoCoMo to leverage mutually beneficial strengths. TRJ operates an
extensive network of more than 100 outlets in Japan and has developed a strong brand,
particularly among young people and music lovers. DoCoMo boasts about 50 million
customers and extensive know-how in operating i-mode wireless phone Internet and Mobile
Wallet services/iD credit card service. TRJ has become a Mobile Wallet/iD retailer. The
combination of these strengths and resources will foster new value-added services and
increase convenience for the customers of both companies. DoCoMo expects to increase the
value of its wireless phones as essential tools for everyday life by turning them into powerful
devices for enjoying music-related information.
2.2.4 Other Challenges
In business fields other than Mobile Wallet and credit cards, DoCoMo is trying to
develop new businesses to create additional revenue sources. DoCoMo has entered into
Internet auction business and broadcasting business.
2.2.4.1 Alliance with Rakuten (Internet Auction Business)
In October 2005, DoCoMo entered into an agreement with Rakuten, a leading
Japanese e-commerce company, to form a business and capital alliance that would provide
Internet auction services over wireless phones and PCs. Rakuten spun off part of its Internet
auction business as the newly established Rakuten Auction. DoCoMo acquired a 40% stake
of Rakuten Auction for Y4.2 billion. Rakuten Auction will expand its Internet auction service
to allow DoCoMo customers to participate using their wireless phones. Rakuten Auction
plans to develop other services in the Internet auction field. The agreement will enable the
companies to mutually leverage complementary strengths, namely, DoCoMo's expertise in i-
mode and Rakuten's expertise in the Internet auction business. In addition, Rakuten will
expand its auction business through mobile Internet phones owing to the increasing demand
for DoCoMo's popular 3G service, while DoCoMo further diversify its revenue stream by
gaining a service not tied to communications traffic.
2.2.4.2 One-Segment Territorial Broadcasting
One-segment broadcasting commenced in April 2006. Since this enables even
cellphone users to view digital broadcasts, broadcasters will greatly expand their reach. In
addition to traditional TV broadcasts, one-segment broadcasting also allows two-way data
services that utilize advanced communications features.
In January 2006, DoCoMo agreed to acquire an approximate 2.6% stake in Fuji
Television for Y20.7 billion. DoCoMo and Fuji Television have been discussing how to link
mobile communications and broadcasting. The agreement preceded the launch of "One-
segment" terrestrial digital broadcasting on April 1, 2006, which presents new opportunities
for links with mobile services. The partners will cooperate closely with each other by sharing
resources and expertise to create a new market and develop innovative mobile
communications and broadcasting services.
In February 2006, DoCoMo agreed in principle with Nippon Television Network
Corporation (NTV) to begin a business tie-up to develop content and related services that
combines mobile communications and conventional TV programs. Under the agreement, the
companies formed a seven-year limited liability partnership with each partner investing Y5
billion. The partnership invests in and develops content, including TV programs that can be
viewed using mobile phones. In addition, the two companies jointly study new business
opportunities, including a service that combines One-segment terrestrial digital broadcasting.
2.3 Summary
As the analysis shows, it is difficult for Japanese wireless telecom operators to grow
sustainably if they continue to follow the existing business model, because the domestic
market is close to saturation and tariff reduction battles occur repeatedly among competitors,
especially since introducing the flat rate package for 3G data transmission. This competitive
environment will become even fiercer with the introduction of Mobile Number Portability
and the addition of new entrants later in 2006. In addition, new wireless technologies, such as
WiMAX, may become a threat to the growth strategies of existing operators.
In such a highly competitive business environment, DoCoMo has begun to seek
additional new revenue sources through the implementation of new business models such as
Mobile Wallet. DoCoMo aims to build an unprecedented business model in the wireless
telecommunication industry--the fusion of the credit card business and wireless phones--a
business that does not depend on the existing telecommunication traffic business.
Recently, DoCoMo disclosed the investments in KT Freetel (South Korea) and PLDT
(Philippines). I believe that these types of investment in some of the growing foreign markets,
combined with a new business model for the domestic market, are important strategies that
will help to ensure continuous growth for DoCoMo. Both the new business model and cross-
border investments represent important ways to enhance value for wireless telecom operators
in this mature market.
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Figure 2.7 Major investments for future growth, and their objectives
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CHAPTER 3
NTT DoCoMo's Global Business Strategy
In this chapter, I will examine NTT DoCoMo's global strategies over the past several
years. DoCoMo actively invested in foreign operators from 1999 to 2000. However, a year
later it suffered large losses following the plunge in telecom stock prices. As a result,
DoCoMo changed its strategy to a pursuit of global alliances that did not require enormous
investment. Recently, after a four-year interval, DoCoMo executed two cross-border
investments.
3.1 Overview
3.1.1 Company Profile
DoCoMo is Japan's leading wireless telecommunications services provider and one
of the largest cellular telephone service operators in the world as measured by total number
of cellular subscribers, with an aggregate cellular subscriber base of approximately 48.82
million and an estimated domestic market share of 56.1% as of March 31, 2005. The
company's financial profile is characterized by significant revenues and earnings, consistent
operating margins, and a strong balance sheet. For the year ended March 31, 2005, DoCoMo
had operating revenues of 4,844,610 million (US$45,184 million) and operating income of
Y784,166 million (US$7,314 million), representing an operating margin of 16.2%. The net
income was Y747,564 million (US$6,972 million), which was equivalent to net income per
share of ¥15,771 ($147).
3.1.2 Basic Management Policies
With a corporate philosophy of "creating a new world of communications culture,"
DoCoMo aims to contribute to a rich and vigorous society by reinforcing its core business
focused on 3G services, and promoting mobile multimedia services that are useful for
customers and businesses. It also seeks to maximize corporate value in order to be greatly
trusted and highly valued by its shareholders and customers.
3.1.3 Medium- and Long-Term Management Strategies
Competition among carriers in the Japanese cellphone market is expected to intensify
in the future due to increased market penetration rate, diverse customer needs, and the
scheduled introduction of mobile number portability (MPN) in Japan during FY 2007.
Against this backdrop, DoCoMo will seek to reinforce its core businesses by taking
comprehensive measures to improve its offerings in the areas of handsets, services, rate plans,
network coverage and quality, and after-sales support, in an effort to react swiftly and
precisely to the diverse needs of customers from a "customer-centric" perspective.
At the same time, DoCoMo will review its under-performing businesses, and
continue its endeavors to boost operational efficiency through reduced handset procurement
and network costs and a more efficient allocation of distributor commissions. This is
expected to strengthen the company's competitive position.
To create new channels for revenue generation, DoCoMo will actively expand its
business domains based on the three principal growth strategies of "multimedia," "ubiquity,"
and "globalization."
From Voice to Non-voice
Multimedia
U biquity ..... ......
For everything mobile
Core Businesses
From Domestic to International
Source: NTT DoCoMo (2005)
Figure 3.1 NTT DoCoMo's medium- to long-term growth strategies
As the company transforms its cellular handsets to a multifunctional tool for everyday
life and business, it will also evolve its cellular services by equipping handsets with
electronic money, credit card payment options, transportation tickets, and other features,
thereby creating new revenue sources that are independent from traditional volume-based
communication charges. To keep abreast with and react dynamically to the intensifying
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competition and changes in the market, DoCoMo plans to continually advance its cellular
services, aggressively expand its business domains, and thus enhance its enterprise value.
3.1.3.1 Multimedia
To increase the use of i-mode and FOMA services, which can transmit large amounts
of data at high speeds, DoCoMo plans to add more handsets tailored to user's needs in its
product lineup, and will strive to develop and provide a wide array of sophisticated non-voice
services, including visual communications and video/text delivery services. DoCoMo also
embarked on the development of High-Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) system-a
technology that further enhances the packet transmission speeds supported by the FOMA
network.
3.1.3.2 Ubiquity
In addition to conventional efforts to expand usage by promoting services such as
remote control over intelligent home appliances and information distribution for automobiles
(Telematics), DoCoMo intends to promote "linkages with brick-and-mortar services" with
other related companies, thereby combining its wireless phone services with various
commercial transactions through external interface capabilities embedded in cellular handsets,
including contactless IC chips, bar codes, and infrared data transmission.
3.1.3.3 Globalization
As competition in wireless telecommunications business expands globally, DoCoMo
intends to enhance user convenience and increase the company's revenue opportunities by
further expanding its "i-mode" alliances and offering W-CDMA-based global handsets. Also,
in view of global competition, DoCoMo will look into a wide range of opportunities for
revenue growth, including investments in or alliances with telecommunications carriers,
enterprises that own promising technologies, and companies engaged in wireless
telecommunications-related peripheral businesses, while taking into consideration the overall
synergies expected from such alliances.
3.2 Global Investment Strategy
3.2.1 Technology-Driven Policy
In 1992, DoCoMo began full-scale research into W-CDMA to realize its third-
generation (3G) wireless telecommunication services. Mobile multimedia is required in the
3G world in order to enjoy music, images, and video via wireless handsets, and high-speed
data transmission is required to support these advanced services. Furthermore, international
standardization (IMT-2000) was supposed to provide the same quality of service worldwide.
However, DoCoMo's position in the global wireless telecommunication industry was
unusual from a technical viewpoint. Generally, research and development in wireless
telecommunication has been done by manufacturers excluding Japan. The DoCoMo
laboratory, which belongs to NTT's school, has long been at the top in research and
development of wireless telecommunications. In addition, DoCoMo and NTT built
cooperative relationships with manufacturers such as NEC, Panasonic, and Fujitsu after
DoCoMo was spun off from NTT. By comparison, telecommunication manufacturers such as
Ericsson and Nokia (i.e., not telecommunication operators like DoCoMo), have researched
and developed their advanced wireless technologies in Europe. They had large-scale research
and development formations that were far superior to those of the Japanese manufacturers,
because their GSM system-the European 2G system-had expanded throughout the world
except in Japan. However, in 1997, DoCoMo decided to promote the standardization of W-
CDMA in cooperation with Ericsson and Nokia.
The international standard for 3G, IMT 2000, was instituted by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), a subordinate organization of the United Nations. There
are two major streams of standardization. One is W-CDMA, developed primarily by
DoCoMo and Ericsson. The second is CDMA2000, the U.S. method recommended by
Qualcomm. Concrete specifications for both methods were examined by working groups, and
DoCoMo took a leading role in the working group responsible for devising the
standardization of W-CDMA. Ultimately, it was decided that the wireless telecommunication
world would be split between by the two major methods, W-CDMA and CDMA2000, as
international standardization progressed.
It was DoCoMo's hope that more wireless operators would adopt W-CDMA because
it had spent more than one trillion yen on research and development for the new method. At
the same time, DoCoMo recognized the potential of wireless phone Internet service,
especially given the success of i-mode in Japan, and it was believed that the new business
model would be expanded worldwide.
Thus, DoCoMo developed its basic strategy of global investments to focus on
expanding W-CDMA and i-mode to as many overseas wireless telecom operators as possible.
3.2.2 Major Global Deals
In the relatively short period between 1999 and 2001, DoCoMo acquired a minority
share of wireless telecommunication operators in Hong Kong, UK, Netherlands (the Dutch
operator has subsidiaries in Germany and Belgium), US, and Taiwan, as shown in Table 3.1.
The key objective of these investments was to make W-CDMA the defacto standard and to
establish mobile multimedia services in the world's major markets. During this same period,
DoCoMo successfully expanded its footprint in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. Most partners
agreed that W-CDMA should be introduced as the primary 3G technology, and they
supported the use of i-mode service. It seemed that DoCoMo's global investment strategy
might be successful.
Date Partner/Investee Amount (Y, bil) Share
Dec. 1999
(May. 2001) Hutchison Telephone Co., Ltd. 46.2 25.37%
Sep. 2000 Hutchison 3G UK Holdings Ltd. 185.7 15.00%
Aug. 2000 KPN Mobile N.V. 407.3 15.00%
Jan. 2001(Feb. 2002) AT&T Wireless Service, Inc. 1,165.5 16.01%Feb. 2002
(Jun. 2001) KG Telecommunications Co., Ltd 68.8 21.42%(Jun. 2001)
Source: NTT DoCoMo (2000, 2001)
Table 3.1 NTT DoCoMo investments in wireless telecom operators
DoCoMo invested ¥1.9 trillion in total. However, its attitude toward such investments
was different from its rival, Vodafone. Vodafone took control of the target companies
through majority shareholdings through a leveraged M&A; DoCoMo chose minority
shareholding up to a maximum of 25% without controlling its target.' DoCoMo's top priority
1 In general, the shareholding ratio represents the relation of risk to return. Although a firm can control
a company tightly with more than 50% shareholding, such a position also involves greater risk.
was to expand W-CDMA and i-mode to overseas wireless telecom operators, so DoCoMo
management decided that majority shareholding was not required as part of its investment
strategy.
Why did DoCoMo invest -Y1.9 trillion in these operators in such a short term?
Because major wireless operators worldwide were entering into M&As around the same time.
Vodafone, DoCoMo's chief competitor, had actively sought M&As, for example, with
AirTouch and its acquisition of German Mannesmann. In addition, Deutsche Telekom
purchased Voice Stream (a GSM operator in the U.S.), and France Telecom purchased
Orange in the UK. Singapore Telecom was eager to invest in Asian operators to improve its
international presence. Finally, in addition to its desire to spread W-CDMA and i-mode to
foreign countries, DoCoMo management believed its domestic business would have been
endangered if the company did not hold a dominant position in the global market.
3.2.3 The Telecom 'Bubble'
Excessive expectations for the success of wireless telecommunications were largely
responsible for the so-called telecom 'bubble' that occurred mainly in Europe. Many analysts
believe it was caused by M&As among major operators, as well as 3G license auctions in
Europe. This resulted in abnormal peaks in the prices of telecom shares at the beginning of
2000 (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). When the telecom bubble burst, along with the economic
bubble, the investment value plunged because the major telecom operators had invested at
unusually high prices. As a result, the major operators were forced to reduce their acquired
asset value to conform to accounting regulations.
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3G license auctions were one cause of the economic bubble. In particular, license
prices in the UK and Germany had soared due to strong expectations for the potential of 3G
(see Table 3.2). For example, the total bidding amount in Germany reached £50.8 billion and
the amount in UK was £38 billion. The enormous cost put heavy pressure on the financial
position of the auction winners, and by the end of 2000 the major credit-rating agencies cut
the ratings of the auction participants.
Total Value PopulationNumber Method Value/Person(EUR millions) (thousands)
Germany 6 50,800 Auction 82,071 618.98
UK 6 38,000 Auction 58,200 652.92
Italy 6 12,200 Auction 57,523 212.09
France 4 10,000 Screening 58,607 170.63
Netherlands 5 2,700 Auction 15,604 173.03
Austria 6 700 Auction 8,072 86.72
Spain 4 500 Screening 39,323 12.72
Belgium 4 450 Auction 10,188 44.17
Portugal 4 400 Screening 9,802 40.81
Sweden 4 0.05 Screening 8,846 0.01
Source: Nikkei (2001), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication of Japan (2001)
Table 3.2 Granting methods and total value of 3G licenses in Europe
3.2.4 Impairment Review
DoCoMo accounted for its investment by using the equity method, which requires
that a company assess if a decline in value of any such investment has occurred, and if so,
whether such decline is other than temporary. DoCoMo performs a review for impairment
whenever events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying amount of an
investment may not be recoverable. Factors that DoCoMo consider important, which could
trigger an impairment review, include the following:
* Significant and/or continuing declines in the market value of telecommunication
industry companies;
* Current period operating cash flow losses of investee;
* Significant underperformance of historical cash flows of the investee;
* Significant impairment losses or write-downs recorded by the investee;
* Significant changes in the quoted market price of public investee affiliates;
* Negative results among competitors of investee affiliates; and
* Other negative industry or economic trends.
In performing such evaluations, DoCoMo utilizes various information, including cash flow
projections, independent valuations and, if applicable, stock price analysis.
Because of the economic and financial environment surrounding the
telecommunication industry and the significant declines in equity value among global
telecommunications companies in recent years, DoCoMo reviewed the business outlook of
its affiliates to determine if the value of DoCoMo's investments had suffered a decline that
was other than temporary. As a result of these evaluations, DoCoMo determined that there
were other-than-temporary declines in the values of several of its investee affiliates and in
FY 2001 recorded impairment charges. The gross impairment charges were Y664,493 million
for AT&T Wireless, Y320,481 million for KPN Mobile, Y36,461 million for KG
Telecommunications, and Y56 ,444 million for Hutchison 3G UK. DoCoMo also recorded
impairment charges in fiscal 2002. The gross impairment charges were Y284,078 million for
AT&T Wireless, 1 17,898 million for KPN Mobile, Y9,619 million for KG
Telecommunications, Y123,245 million for H3G UK. Additionally DoCoMo recorded
impairment charge of Y8,612 million for Hutchison Telephone in fiscal 2004. Details of each
transaction are provided below.
3.2.4.1 AT&T Wireless
In July 2001, AT&T completed the planned spin-off of its wireless group, AT&T
Wireless Group. In connection with the spin-off, all the assets and liabilities of AT&T
Wireless Group were transferred to a new entity, AT&T Wireless, a wholly owned subsidiary
of AT&T. The spin-off was then affected by redeeming all the outstanding shares of AT&T
Wireless Group tracking stock in exchange for shares of AT&T Wireless common stock and
distributing additional shares of AT&T Wireless common stock to holders of AT&T
common stock, resulting in AT&T Wireless becoming an independent, publicly traded
company. DoCoMo's investment in AT&T Wireless preferred tracking stock was converted
to AT&T Wireless common stock, resulting in approximately 16% voting interest in AT&T
Wireless. DoCoMo accounted for its common stock investment in AT&T Wireless using the
equity method due to its ability to exercise significant influence over operating and financial
policies, primarily through board representation, appointment of key management positions,
approval rights, and rights to require repurchase of the investment under certain
circumstances.
In February 2004, AT&T Wireless entered into a merger agreement with Cingular
Wireless, which became effective in October 2004. It was agreed that all outstanding shares
of AT&T Wireless common stock would be converted to cash at US$15 per share. As a
result, DoCoMo's entire AT&T Wireless shares transferred to Cingular, and DoCoMo
received US$6,495 million (approximately Y699,514 million) in cash.
3.2.4.2 Hutchison 3G UK
In May 2004, DoCoMo agreed to sell its entire shareholding in H3G UK to Hutchison
Whampoa Ltd. for £120 million. Under terms of the agreement, DoCoMo will receive final
payment in December 2006, either in cash or shares of Hutchison Telecommunications
International Ltd., a subsidiary of HWL.
3.2.4.3 KG Telecommunications
In October 2003, KGT entered into a stock purchase agreement with Far EasTone
Telecommunications Co., Ltd., a wireless telecom operator in Taiwan, by which KGT agreed
to become a wholly owned subsidiary of FET. Simultaneously, DoCoMo signed a
memorandum of understanding with FET to collaborate on promoting 3G wireless phone
service and i-mode in Taiwan. Pursuant to the stock purchase agreement, KGT merged into a
subsidiary of FET and ceased to exist as of January 2004. In April 2004, the entire
transaction was complete, and former shareholders of KGT received 0.46332 FET shares
plus NT$6.72 for each KGT share they owned. As a result, DoCoMo became an
approximately 5% shareholder of FET, and received approximately NT$2.5 billion
(approximately Y8 billion).
3.2.4.4 KPN Mobile
In November 2002, DoCoMo was asked by KPN Mobile to subscribe for additional
shares of KPNM, as DoCoMo had such a right in order to maintain its portion of voting
rights. In December 2002, DoCoMo decided not to exercise its right to subscribe for
additional shares of KPNM. As a result, DoCoMo's ownership interest in KPNM decreased
from 15% to approximately 2.2%, and DoCoMo lost certain of its minority shareholder's
rights under the shareholders' agreement.
In October 2005, DoCoMo agreed to transfer its 2.2% interest in KPN Mobile to KPN,
KPNM's corporate parent, while continuing to license its i-mode technology to KPNM.
Under the agreement, KPN agreed to cooperate with DoCoMo in the smooth operation of the
global i-mode alliance, and paid DoCoMo five million euros.
3.2.5 Recent Investments
As mentioned previously, DoCoMo was forced to take massive impairments of nearly
¥1,500 billion on its investment in overseas operators including AT&T Wireless, KPN
Mobile and Hutchison 3G. However, two recent overseas investments are different, for the
following reasons.
* Investment amount: Previous investments occurred during the telecom bubble. The
recent investment amounts are smaller because of the simultaneous burst of the
economic bubble.
* Timing: Previous investees adopted GPRS and EDGE (2.5G), improved GSM (2G)
technologies, because they could not afford to invest in the W-CDMA (3G)
infrastructure owing to the burst of the economic bubble. These strategies did not
necessarily concur with DoCoMo's strategy at that time. However, W-CDMA is
now rapidly expanding globally.
Expectation of profit: More roaming service revenue would be expected because the
number of travelers between Japan and Asian countries is increasing. Moreover,
cost reductions would be expected as a result of joint procurement of terminals and
infrastructure equipment.
3.2.5.1 KT Freetel
In December 2005, DoCoMo entered into an agreement with KT Freetel, the second
largest wireless operator in South Korea, to form a strategic alliance including equity
participation. DoCoMo invested approximately KRW 564.9 billion (approximately Y65.5
billion) to acquire a 10% stake. This alliance enables both companies to provide better
services to customers in their respective markets through the development and promotion of
wireless telecom technologies and applications. The nationwide deployment and early
stabilization of KTF's W-CDMA network, with DoCoMo's technical support, is a key to
achieving these objectives.
3.2.5.2 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
In January 2006, DoCoMo entered into an agreement with NTT Communications,
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and PLDT's largest shareholder First Pacific
Company, that DoCoMo would acquire 12,633,486 PLDT shares (approximately 7% of
PLDT's issued shares) owned by NTT Com for approximately Y52.1 billion. In addition,
DoCoMo and PLDT would form a comprehensive business tie-up, including the launch of i-
mode service in the Philippines.
3.2.5.3 Guam Cellular & Paging and Guam Wireless Telephone Company
In March 2006, DoCoMo wholly acquired Guam Cellular and Guam Wireless for
US$71.8 million. Both companies provide mobile services in Guam and the Northern
Mariana Islands. DoCoMo also provides additional funds up to approximately US$6.5
million to strengthen the newly merged company's facilities and infrastructure. The
acquisitions enable DoCoMo to better serve many Japanese travelers who visit Guam and the
Northern Mariana Islands, and enable the islands' residents to benefit from DoCoMo's
world-leading mobile technology.
3.3 Global Alliance Strategy
3.3.1 i-mode Licensing Agreements
When DoCoMo began its overseas investments, it recognized the strong possibility of
wireless phone Internet service based on the success of i-mode in Japan. DoCoMo also
believed that i-mode would be another means of increasing corporate value for investees.
DoCoMo entered into i-mode licensing agreements with the investees and supported the
introduction of i-mode into those foreign markets. The i-mode licensing agreement is
independent from the investment/shareholding agreement. It is grants the right to use the i-
mode business model and it provides for support and maintenance by DoCoMo. DoCoMo
can share a small percentage of its i-mode sales revenue as a licensing fee. However the
licensing fee itself is too small to contribute to DoCoMo's business performance.
Although DoCoMo entered into contracts with Taiwanese KGT and KPN Mobile's
operating company (which includes KPNM Netherlands, E-plus of Germany and BASE of
Belgium) after acquiring minority shareholding, DoCoMo did not achieve its original
purpose, which was to enhance the corporate value of its investees. In particular, it could not
repair the impaired value of those investees because of the telecom bubble burst. After the
impairment, DoCoMo entered into contracts with wireless operators that it did not have
shareholding.
3.3.2 i-mode Alliances
DoCoMo has now decided to make i-mode alliances the centerpiece of its global
strategy given the stumbling of its investment strategy, largely because such alliances do not
require a cash investment. Table 3.2 provides information about these alliances.
Because i-mode is widely perceived to be better than other wireless phone Internet
services at all points, many wireless operators are interested in i-mode and have decided to
adopt it. Moreover, European wireless telecom operators have become concerned about
Vodafone's aggressive global strategy, these operations believe such an alliance with
DoCoMo is needed to promote economies of scale in procurement in order to remain
competitive with Vodafone.
DoCoMo has concluded i-mode licensing agreements with 14 operators to date, as
shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. The number of i-mode subscribers outside Japan already
exceeds five million, raising the total number of subscribers to approximately 50 million
worldwide. i-mode's addressable subscriber base as a result of these alliances has reached
200 million, surpassing the outreach of Vodafone Group.
Operator Country Licensing Service launch
Far EasTone Taiwan Jun. 2001 Jun. 20 2002
KPN Mobile Netherlands Nov. 2001 Apr. 18 2002
E-Plus Germany Feb. 2002 Mar. 16 2002
BASE Belgium Nov. 2001 Oct. 15 2002
Bouygues Telecom France Apr. 2002 Nov. 15 2002
Telefonica Moviles Spain Jul. 2002 Jun. 26 2003
Wind Italy Jun. 2003 Nov. 19 2003
Cosmote Greece Nov. 2003 Jun. 3 2004
Telestra Australia Jun. 2004 Nov. 10 2004
Cellcom Israel Nov. 2004 Sep. 6 2005
Mobile TeleSystems Russia Dec. 2004 Sep. 15 2005
02 UK UK Nov. 2004 Oct. 1 2005
02 Ireland Ireland Nov. 2004 Oct. 7 2005
StarHub Singapore Jan. 2005 Nov. 19 2005
Source: NTT DoCoMo
Table 3.3 i-mode licensing with partners
Alliance member operators, including DoCoMo, are expecting to enjoy numerous
economies of scale, including joint procurement of handsets and other equipment. Cost
reductions for procurement, which help maintain profit levels, are the most important
challenge facing wireless telecom operators in developed countries, especially those where
revenue growth is declining owing to market saturation. In June 2005, DoCoMo's eight i-
mode alliance partners announced the first joint procurement tie-up for i-mode handsets, in a
Source: NTT DoCoMo (2005)
Figure 3.4 Snapshot of key i-mode results
Source: NTT DoCoMo (2005)
Figure 3.5 Expanding i-mode global alliances
Over 45M paying i-mode subscribers
i-mode penetration: 90% of DoCoMo subscribers
i-mode ARPU = 26% of total ARPU
50% less churn rate (monthly churn at <1%)
A powerful handset portfolio with the most advanced
features
Over 4 600 i-menu sites and 90 000 independent sites
* More than 5M paying i-mode subscribers
* i-mode ARPU = 46 to C8
* A wide portfolio of exclusive, differentiated handsets
* Over 2 500 i-menu sites and 20 000 independent sites
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deal with Korean vendor LG Electronics. Other joint procurement deals will be more active
in the future.
3.4 Summary
DoCoMo acquired a minority stake of wireless telecom operators in developed
countries in order to expand W-CDMA and i-mode, which DoCoMo developed. However,
most of the investment deals occurred during the telecom bubble. Consequently, when the
bubble burst, DoCoMo and other major operators were forced to write down their
investments-something no one could have predicted. DoCoMo decided to withdraw from
major investees that had lost their investment attractiveness, and instead shifted to i-mode
alliance strategies that did not require cash injections.
Fourteen wireless operators have launched i-mode service. This has created an i-mode
addressable subscriber base of 200 million, surpassing that of Vodafone Group. In addition,
W-CDMA was adopted by most European wireless telecom operators (see Figure 3.6). In the
United States, Cingular, which acquired AT&T Wireless, has also adopted W-CDMA.
Although the burst of the telecom and economic bubbles forced DoCoMo to change
its global business strategy, the company is still on the path to achieving its initial target-
expanding W-CDMA and i-mode to as many overseas wireless telecom operators as possible.
Therefore, it can be said that DoCoMo's global strategy was successful from the
technological perspective.
However, the piece of its global strategy that depended on a favorable return on
investment has not been successful. Moreover, the investment targets were limited to one
category-wireless operators in advanced countries--because DoCoMo sought to widely
diffuse its advanced technologies. I believe that such non-diversified investments pose a
serious financial problem. As stock exchange rules for investment purposes were not adopted
in Japan, all investments were done in cash, which could cause even worse damage.
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Figure 3.6 W-DCMA worldwide
It should also be noted that Vodafone minimized the damage it suffered as a result of the
economic bubble burst by using stock exchanges in most of its M&As.
As described in Chapter 2, wireless telecom operators cannot expect to enhance their
corporate value by relying solely on existing domestic telecommunication traffic, because the
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Korea
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UK
Germany
France
Italy
US
L !
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market is saturated and competition in the market is intensifying. Therefore, DoCoMo has
begun to implement new growth drivers, such as a credit card business, that does not depend
on existing telecommunication traffic. Cross-border investments could also be a driver for
securing future growth. DoCoMo should work on global investments as a means of
enhancing sustainable corporate value, and set a premium on afinance-driven policy in
addition to a technology-driven policy as it becomes increasingly involved in cross-border
investments.
DoCoMo still generates a high level of cash flow from its existing businesses, as
shown in Table 3.3, even though its growth rate as decelerated. Moreover, the accumulated
(Y million)
2002 2003 2004 2005
Free cash flow 215,995 713,180 862,934 603,256
Source: NTT DoCoMo
Table 3.4 DoCoMo's Free Cash Flow
treasury stocks that have been purchased to boost stock market prices now exceed 5 10
billion. DoCoMo should reinvest these abundant investment resources effectively to augment
and increase its corporate growth.
I will describe DoCoMo's future global investment strategy in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 4
Vodafone's Global Business Strategy
In this chapter, I will examine the global business strategy of Vodafone, which is
NTT DoCoMo's major rival in the global wireless telecommunication market. While
DoCoMo's global strategy was based on minority investment for DoCoMo technology,
Vodafone pursued a strategy of M&As to construct a global wireless telecom empire.
In Chapter 3 1 defined DoCoMo's global business strategy as a "technology-driven
policy." In contrast, Vodafone's basic philosophy for globalization can be defined as a
"finance-driven policy." I will focus on Vodafone's global deals, which the firm pursued
with the support of this policy.
4.1 Overview
4.1.1 Company Profile
Vodafone is the largest mobile telecommunications network company in the world,
with equity interests in 27 countries and partner networks in 31 additional countries. As of
31 December 2005, Vodafone had approximately 179.3 million customers worldwide.
Details of Vodafone's global presence are shown in Table 4.1, and Figure 4.1 illustrates the
upward trend in the growth of Vodafone customers.
Country Percentage Proportionate Acquiring
ownership # of Customers initial stakes
At 31 Dec 2005
..-..... (%........) ( s)....... .
Principal Markets
Germany 100.00% 29,165 2000
Italy 76.90% 18,208 1999
Japan 97.70% 14,767 1999
Spain 100.00% 12,923 1994
UK 100.00% 16,325 1984
91,388
Other Subsidiaries
Albania 99.90% 748 2001
Australia 100.00% 3,126 1992
Czech Republic 99.90% 2,140 2005
Egypt 50.10% 3,068 1998
Greece 99.80% 4,429 1992
Hungary 100.00% 2,038 1999
Ireland 100.00% 2,047 2000
Malta 100.00% 177 1999
Netherlands 99.90% 3,976 1998
New Zealand 100.00% 2,024 1998
Portugal 100.00% 4,119 1991
Romania 100.00% 6,132 1996
Sweden 100.00% 1,573 1991
35,597
Other Joint Ventures
Fiji 49.00% 95 1994
India 10% 1,633 2003
Kenya 35.00% 1,221 2000
Poland 19.60% 1,774 1996
South Africa 35.00% 7,043 1993
11,766
Associates & Investments
US (Verizon) 44.40% 22,785 1999
Other 17,780
40,565
TOTAL 179,316
Source: Vodafone Group (2005)
Table 4.1 Vodafone's global presence
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Source: Vodafone Group (2005)
Figure 4.1 Subscriber trend for Vodafone Group
In March 2005, Vodafone Group had operating revenues of £34,133 million
(US$64,470 million) and operating profit of £10,904 million (US$20,595 million). Because
of its large goodwill amortization-UKl£14,700 generated from past M&As-net losses were
UK£7,540 million (US$14,242 million), which was equivalent to net loss per share of 11.39p
(21.51c).
4.1.2 Business Strategy
Vodalfone's strategy is to mobilize these markets and, through this process, grow its
voice and data service revenue. In particular, Vodafone seeks to leverage third-generation
(3G) mobile technology in order to develop enhanced, new service offerings for consumers
and business customers. The Group's strategic roadmap identifies six key goals:
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1. delight its customers;
2. build the best global Vodafone team;
3. leverage its global scale and scope;
4. expand its market boundaries;
5. be a responsible business; and,
6. provide superior returns to shareholders.
Vodafone has built a network of mobile operations and is leveraging this to provide
cost and time-to-market advantages. A new program called "One Vodafone" is designed to
leverage this global scale by identifying solutions to be designed and deployed. Vodafone
marketing delivers a wide range of services to its customers while combining the benefits of
global scale and scope with the advantages of local market understanding and responsiveness.
4.2 Global Footprint
4.2.1 First Phase of Development
The company was incorporated in July 1984 as Racal Strategic Radio Ltd., as a
subsidiary of Racal Electronics Plc. In September 1988, it became Racal Telecom Ltd., then
re-registered as Racal Telecom Plc, a public limited company. In October 1988,
approximately 20% of the company's capital was offered to the public. The company was
fully detached from Racal Electronics and became an independent company in September
1991, at which time it changed its name to Vodafone Group Plc. Between 1991 and 1999, the
Group consolidated its position in the UK and enhanced its international interests through a
series of transactions. At the end of March 1999, the Group had mobile operating subsidiaries
in six countries, as well as equity interests in a further seven countries, and a mobile
customer base of 10.4 million.
4.2.2 Second Phase of Development
The Group completed a number of business transactions between 1999 and the end of
March 2002, which transformed it into the world's leading international mobile
telecommunications company. At that time, the Group controlled mobile operations in 16
countries and held equity investments in mobile operations in a further 12 countries. The
mobile customer base was 101.1 million.
During this period, Vodafone executed large-scale M&As in leading markets, such as
the US (AirTouch), Germany (Mannesmann), and Japan (J-Phone), and greatly expanded its
business. This expansion trend is shown in Table 4.2. Vodafone's operating revenue/
EBITDA expanded as a result of the M&As, which in turn strengthened its operations.
Operating losses/net losses at the end of FY 2000 were caused by amortization of goodwill
paid when the M&As were complete. Although the amortization process followed UK
generally accepted accounting principles (UK GAAP), the losses indicate the size of the
goodwill paid when these assets were acquired.
(£ million)
Fiscal year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Operating Revenue 7,873 15,004 22,845 30,375 33,559 34,133
Operating Income/(Loss) 796 (6,998) (11,834) (5,451) (4,230) (4,111)
Net Income (Loss) 487 (9,763) (16,155) (9,819) (9,015) (7,540)
EBITDA 2,443 4,939 8,031 11,217 12,640 13,041
EBITDA margin (%) 31.0% 32.9% 35.2% 36.9% 37.7% 38.2%
CAPEX 1,848 3,698 4,145 5,289 4,508 4,890
Free cash flow (3,718) 14,177 2,365 5,171 8,521 7,847
Source: Vodafone Group (2005)
Table 4.2 Vodafone Group's historical financial data
4.2.3 U.S. Operations
In June 1999, Vodafone merged with US-based AirTouch Communications, which
created Vodafone AirTouch Plc, one of the largest mobile communications companies in the
world in terms of number of subscribers. The company issued approximately 3,046 million
ordinary shares to transferring AirTouch shareholders, in addition to paying out UKE3,477
million.
Verizon Wireless was formed through the merger of four U.S. wireless operators:
Bell Atlantic Mobile, GTE Wireless, AirTouch, and PrimeCo Communications. The merger
followed an agreement made in September 1999 by Bell Atlantic and Vodafone to combine
their wireless operations in the U.S. In April 2000, Vodafone contributed AirTouch and its
interest in PrimeCo, while Bell Atlantic contributed its U.S. wireless operations and its
interest in PrimeCo. In July 2000, after Bell Atlantic and GTE merged to form Verizon
Communications, GTE's U.S. wireless operations were added to Verizon Wireless. The
formation of Verizon Wireless resulted in net proceeds to Vodafone of approximately
US$2,500 million relating to the assumption of debt. Further proceeds of US$2,000 million
have been realized since then, relating to the disposal of overlapping properties in the U.S.;
such disposals were a condition for regulatory approval.
4.2.4 German Operations
Vodafone announced its intention to acquire Mannesmann AG in November 1999.
Vodafone had already acquired 34.8% of Mannesmann when it merged with AirTouch. As of
March 2000, Vodafone had transferred 30,141 million ordinary shares to the transferring
Mannesmann shareholders. In April 2000, it received conditional consent from the EC to
acquire Mannesmann. Vodafone acquired 98.62% of Mannesmann's issued share capital and
99.72% of its convertible bonds. Mannesmann AG was subsequently renamed Vodafone AG.
The Group later increased its shareholding in Vodafone AG to 99.6%. Following the
transaction, Vodafone disposed of Mannesmann's non-telecommunications businesses,
including its engineering, automotive, and watch businesses.
One important condition of the EC's approval of Vodafone's acquisition of
Mannesmann was the disposal of Orange pci, a UK mobile network operator owned by
Mannesmann. Orange was sold to France Telecom in August 2000 for a cash payment of
approximately £21,400 million, a £2,200 million France Telecom loan note, and 113,846,211
France Telecom shares. France Telecom also assumed Orange's existing debts, which
Etotaled UK£4,100 million. Vodafone no longer holds any shares in France Telecom.
4.2.5 Japanese Operations
In October 1999, Vodafone increased its stakes in nine regional mobile companies in
Japan. It already had interests in the nine companies ranging from 4.5% to 15%; it increased
its interests to more than 20% in each company to become the second-largest shareholder,
behind Japan Telecom, in each venture. Total consideration for the increased ownership in
the three digital phone and six digital Tu-Ka companies was UK£342 million.
Following this transaction, Vodafone entered into an agreement with its partners,
Japan Telecom and BT, to restructure its ownership interests, resulting in the formation of J-
Phone Communications Co Ltd, in which Vodafone held a direct 26% stake, acquiring a
controlling interest of approximately 50% in each of the nine companies. Japan Telecom and
BT held interests of 54% and 20%, respectively.
In April 2001, Vodafone completed the acquisition of a 15% equity stake in Japan
Telecom from two existing shareholders, West Japan Railway Co. and Central Japan Railway
Co., for a total of Y125.1 billion. Vodafone first invested in Japan Telecom in January 2001
when it made an initial payment ofY124.6 billion. In addition, Vodafone acquired a 10%
stake in Japan Telecom from AT&T for approximately US$1,350 million, bringing its stake
in Japan Telecom to 25%. In May, Vodafone agreed to acquire, for a cash consideration of
approximately UK£3,700 million, BT's ownership interests in the J-Phone Group and Japan
Telecom, comprising UK£3,100 million for BT's combined shareholdings of 20% in Japan
Telecom and 20% in J-Phone Communications, with a further UK£600 million for BT's
aggregate interest of approximately 4.9% in the J-Phone operating companies. The
transaction was completed in June 2001, except for the acquisition of BT's interests in the
operating subsidiaries of J-Phone Communications, which was completed in July 2001. As a
result of these transactions, Vodafone had a 46% direct interest in J-Phone Communications.
In August 2001, it was announced that J-Phone Communications and the J-Phone
operating companies would merge to form a new company, J-Phone Co Ltd. The merger
became effective in November 2001 and, as a result, Vodafone held a 39.67% direct
ownership interest in the new company. In September 2001, Japan Vodafone announced an
agreed tender offer by its subsidiary, Vodafone International Holdings BV, to acquire 21.7%
of the ordinary shares of Japan Telecom, for a cash consideration of up to Y3 12 billion. The
offer was completed in October 2001, bringing the group's total interest to 66.7%.
In August 2003, Japan Telecom Holdings Co agreed to sell its wholly owned fixed-
line subsidiary, Japan Telecom Co Ltd, to an affiliate of Ripplewood Holdings. Under the
terms of the agreement, Japan Telecom Holdings was to receive total proceeds of Y261.3
billion (approximately US$2.21 billion), consisting of V228.8 billion in cash and Y32.5
billion of redeemable preferred equity. The cash received was to be used to reduce
Vodafone's consolidated net debt. The transaction was completed in November 2003. In
October 2003, Japan J-Phone changed its name to Vodafone KK (Vodafone Japan) and
adopted the Vodafone brand and service names.
In May 2004, Vodafone Holdings KK and Vodafone KK jointly announced that their
respective boards had agreed to merge the two companies. Vodafone Holdings KK would be
the surviving entity and would be renamed Vodafone KK after completion of the merger. It
was stated that the boards of directors of Vodafone Holdings KK and Vodafone KK believed
that the reorganization of the existing structure would enable the merged company to operate
with increased efficiency and stronger management focus. Under the terms of the merger, the
merger ratio would mean that Vodafone KK shareholders would receive 7.5898 Vodafone
Holdings KK shares for every share of Vodafone KK held. Following the merger, the former
shareholders of Vodafone Holdings KK and Vodafone KK would own approximately 58.9%
and 41.1% of the merged company, respectively. In connection with this agreement,
Vodafone bid £2,600 million pounds to buy out minority investors in Japan and promised to
buy back stock valued at UK£3,000 million.
In June 2004, Vodafone plc acquired 96.1% of its Japanese subsidiary, Vodafone
Holdings KK. Vodafone paid Y300,000 per share of Vodafone Holdings KK, or a total of
around Y281.6 billion, to raise its ownership in Vodafone Holdings KK from 79.6% to 96.1%.
Vodafone Holdings was delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange at the end of March 2005.
4.2.6 Findings
Vodafone not only expanded its global footprint but also restructured the group, its
UK headquarters, and its investees, in order to establish a new management structure for
pursuing global synergies. Its strategy in the first development phase was to expand the
company's business scale. Then Vodafone leveraged the skilled human resources it had
acquired through various M&As. For example, the current CEO, Arun Sarin, came from the
former AirTouch. The organization that promotes Vodafone's global business in the UK was
started with staff acquired from Mannesmann.
After acquiring control rights of its investees, Vodafone separated and sold the non-
core assets, such as the fixed-line telephone business, to concentrate on the core business of
wireless telephones. Vodafone did not intend to pursue portfolio-type investment, but instead
to focus on the wireless telephone business. However, it chose a finance-driven policy to
accomplish this purpose. Figure 4.2 shows the sequence of Japanese and German acquisitions.
2001
.............................................................................
...... X. Japan Telecom Fixed/JapanSold in 2003 ...
X* Orange Wireless/UK
Sold in 2000 ..............................................................................
...... Infostrada Fixed/Italy
Sold in 2000 ..............................................................................
Sold in 2000 ..............................................................................
...... ...... -Atecs Mannesmann Tube Busnginessering/GermanySold in 2000 .............................................................................
....... X.. ..... Mannesmann Tube Business/Germany
Sold in 2000 .......................... ...........-.
X.............. Mannesmann Watch Business/Germany
Sold in 2000 ...............................................................................
*****....... X I tele.ring Fixed/Austria
Sold in 2000 ..............................................................................
Source: Vodafone Group / adapted by the author
Figure 4.2 Disposition of non-core assets in Japan and Germany
Vodafone introduced its management system to all of its acquired companies,
changed their names to Vodafone, and eventually assimilated them into the Vodafone culture.
At the same time, it shifted the headquarters organization from a regional management
structure (regionally independent management) to a synergy-creating management structure
with corporate functions centralized in the UK (see Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3 Development phases for Vodafone's synergy-creating management structure
4.3 Turnaround
Vodafone's 2005 announcements of interim financial results drew attention to a sharp
slowdown in the European and Japanese markets. Several European countries posted growth
that was slower than GDP. APRU in most of these countries also decreased compared with
the previous period, e.g., Germany: £25.7 / £24.4; Italy: £30.3 / £30.1; Japan: Y6,279 /
Y5,983; UK: £26.6 / £24.9; US: $53.2 / $51.6.
Like the Japanese market, the wireless telecommunication markets in Western
European countries are close to saturation and suffer severe tariff reductions. It will be
difficult for Vodafone to increase its corporate value if it continues to pursue existing
(1991 - 1999)
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markets. In 2005 Vodafone revised its M&A strategy to achieve sustainable growth. How is
it reacting to the current slowdown? It chose strategies such as buying assets in emerging
markets and disposing of assets that were not expected to grow (Vodafone had never
disposed of assets before). This reaction is totally different from DoCoMo's strategy in the
mature Japanese market. Vodafone has consistently chosen a strategy based on a finance-
driven policy. All the listed companies maintain their respective levels of EBITDA margin
and increase their free cash flow to meet investor's expectation. A stock price is theoretically
decided by net present value (NPV) of free cash flow that a company or an asset generates.
Vodafone has begun to change its asset portfolio composed of wireless phone operators that
create corporate value.
4.3.1 Emerging Markets
As sustainable growth in the core market is not expected, emerging markets, as
Vodafone's new growth driver, will matter more and more. After a period of relative quiet,
with no M&As over the last two years, 2005 saw a flurry of transactions. These were
concentrated on increasing Vodafone's presence in emerging markets
Eastern Europe (Czech and Romania)
In March 2005, Vodafone entered into agreements with Telesystem International
Wireless Inc. of Canada to acquire approximately 79% of the share capital of MobiFon S.A.
in Romania (this increases Vodafone Group ownership to approximately 99%) and 100% of
the share capital of Oskar Mobil a.s. in the Czech Republic for a cash consideration of
approximately $3.5 billion (£1.8 billion) to be satisfied from Vodafone Group's cash
resources. The principal benefits to Vodafone Group are:
* Expansion of its footprint into two attractive European markets.
- adjacent to existing Vodafone Group markets
- combined population of around 32 million
- strong growth economies
* Control of MobiFon, a leading operator in Romania
- mobile penetration of approximately 47%
- 4.9 million customers, equivalent to 48% market share
- revenues of US$723 million, delivering 30% growth year-on-year
- EBITDA of US$345 million with 48% EBITDA margin
* Control of Oskar, the fastest-growing operator in the Czech Republic
- 1.8 million customers, equivalent to 17% market share
- revenues of US$552 million, delivering 35% growth year-on-year
- EBITDA of US$162 million with 29% EBITDA margin
India
In October 2005, Vodafone agreed to acquire an economic interest of 10% in Bharti
Tele-Ventures Limited for a cash consideration equivalent to Rs.66.56 billion (f0.82 billion).
Vodafone has entered into an agreement to acquire a 4.39% economic interest in BTVL
through Bharti Enterprises Private Limited and a 5.61% direct interest in BTVL from
Warburg Pincus LLC. The principal benefits of the transaction to Vodafone are that it
provides:
* Expansion of Vodafone's footprint into India, a large and under-penetrated market of
global importance with significant growth potential
- 4th largest economy in the world with a population of 1.1 billion
- 3rd largest mobile market in Asia with 65.1 million customers currently
- Mobile and fixed line penetration currently at approximately 6.0% and 4.4%,
respectively
- 53.3% year-on-year mobile market growth, representing 22.6 million additional
customers
* Investment in the fastest-growing mobile operator in India
- 14.1 million mobile customers as of September 2005, equivalent to 21.8%
customer market share
- One of only three Indian mobile operators with a nationwide footprint
- In the six months ended September 2005, BTVL's mobile business delivered
year-on-year growth of 62% in customers, 58% in revenues and 64% in EBITDA
- In the six months ended September 2005, BTVL's fixed line business delivered
year-on-year growth of 39% in customers, 30% in revenues and 34% in EBITDA
* Active role in the partnership
- The transaction delivers material rights in BTVL as a result of which Vodafone is
expected to proportionately consolidate BTVL
- Vodafone will have the right to appoint two directors to the BTVL Board
South Africa
In November 2005, Vodafone has entered into agreements with the Rembrandt Trust
Limited to acquire up to an additional 15% economic interest in Vodacom Group Limited for
a net cash consideration of up to R16.0 billion (£1.35 billion). This increases Vodafone's
effective shareholding in Vodacom from 35% to 50%. An increased interest in Vodacom is
consistent with Vodafone's strategy of increasing its exposure to growth markets. The
principal benefits to Vodafone would be:
* Increased exposure to the attractive and growing South African market
- market penetration approximately 57% with further growth potential
- population of approximately 47 million
- largest economy in Africa with forecast GDP growth of 9%
* Increased exposure to other African growth markets including Democratic Republic
of Congo, Tanzania, Lesotho and Mozambique
* Increased exposure to Vodacom, an attractive asset with:
- 17.2 million customers, 14.3 million in South Africa as of June 2005
- revenue growth of 20% in the 12 months to 31 March 2005
- EBITDA growth of 24% in the 12 months to 31 March 2005
- implied 3.2% historic dividend yield
Turkey
In December 2005, Vodafone agreed to acquire Telsim, the number two mobile
operator in Turkey, from the Turkish Savings Deposit and Investment Fund, for a
consideration of $4.55 billion. The acquisition of Telsim represents a unique opportunity to
gain control of a mobile business in one of Europe's largest markets and is consistent with
Vodafone's strategy of increasing its exposure to growth markets. The principal benefits to
Vodafone are:
* Exposure to the attractive and growing Turkish market
- Population of 72 million people, the fourth-largest market in which Vodafone
controls an operator
- Market penetration of approximately 53% with significant further growth
potential
- Fast growing and young population, forecast to grow at 1.4% CAGR until 2010
and with approximately 47% under the age of 25
- Population expected to be greater than Germany's by 2017
* Full control of a fast-growing number two mobile operator
- 43% revenue growth in the first seven months of 2005 compared to the same
period in 2004
- Customer growth of 53% and 2.8 million net additional customers in the 12
months to 30 June 2005
- Approximately 9 million total customers
* Uniquely positioned to capture the benefits of a turnaround of Telsim
- Business has historically been under-managed and suffered from under-
investment in its network and customer services
- Vodafone to leverage its position in GSM networks, branding, and successful
customer propositions to turn the business around.
4.3.2 Sale of Vodafone Japan
As mentioned earlier, it took three years for Vodafone to acquire a majority portion of
its Japanese assets. Previously, Vodafone KK (Vodafone Japan) held a strong second
position in the market by being the first to introduce camera phones to the Japanese market.
However, the launch of 3G service was considerably delayed compared to its competitors
such as DoCoMo and au, because it saved CAPEX for 3G. Therefore, Vodafone KK is
ranked lowest in the Japanese wireless telecom market. Although Vodafone KK earned 15%
of the total revenues for Vodafone Group, its EBITDA margin was the lowest among the
other operators in the group. Some analysts speculate that this Japanese arm of Vodafone
may be disposed of to third parties.
In March 2006, Vodafone Group agreed to sell its 97.68% interest in Vodafone Japan
to SoftBank. The sale values Vodafone Japan at an enterprise value of approximately ¥1.8
trillion (£8.9 billion), of which £6.8 billion will be received in cash on closing. Subsequently,
Vodafone will distribute £6 billion in cash to shareholders. Highlights of the deal are as
follows:
* While the nominal enterprise value derived from the cash proceeds and the face
value of the non-cash instruments is Y2.0 trillion (£9.8 billion), Vodafone estimates
that the fair value of the transaction on an enterprise-value basis is ¥1.8 trillion (£8.9
billion).
* SoftBank intends to acquire 100% of the common equity of Vodafone Japan through
its wholly owned SoftBank subsidiary, Bidco.
* As a result of the transaction, Vodafone will receive three principal components of
value:
- Approximately £6.8 billion of cash payable on closing
- Preferred shares in Bidco with a face value of 300 billion (£1.5 billion) carrying
zero dividend. The preferred shares will be redeemable at Bidco's option. After
June 2013 the preferred shares will carry a coupon of 12%.
- A subordinated loan with a face value of 100 billion (£0.5 billion) repayable to
Vodafone. This loan will be subordinated to Bidco's acquisition debt, carries a
coupon of 5%, and is repayable after 30 September 2013.
Vodafone estimates the combined fair value of the preferred shares and the subordinated
loan is approximately £1.1 billion.
* In addition Vodafone has been granted warrants with the right to subscribe to equity
representing 10% of Bidco exercisable after 31 March 2013 subject to certain
minimum cumulative levels of EBITDA being generated between 1 April 2006 and
31 March 2013.
* Vodafone presently intends to retain the preferred shares and the warrants in the
short to medium term.
* SoftBank will assume approximately £0.8 billion of external debt and other liabilities
outstanding from Vodafone Japan.
* The preferred shares confer the right for Vodafone to appoint one director to the
Boards of both Bidco and Vodafone KK.
* Vodafone and SoftBank have entered into discussions regarding the formation of a
joint working relationship involving participation in the supply and distribution of
data and content. The purpose of the relationship is also to provide knowledge and
information sharing between the two parties and to ensure that Vodafone continues
to have access to the ongoing technological and service developments in the mobile
industry in Japan.
4.4 Summary
Compared with NTT DoCoMo's global strategy, Vodafone has taken a completely
different strategy. As described in Chapter 3, DoCoMo acquired a minority stake of wireless
telecom operators in developed countries in order to expand its W-CDMA and i-mode
products, which DoCoMo developed. In contrast, Vodafone acquired a majority stake of
wireless operators to expand the scope and scale of its business in order to pursue synergy
effects afterward.
Vodafone's global strategy is continually focused on financial matters, irrespective of
its development phases. Global expansion led by M&A has been the engine for Vodafone's
growth. In the first phase, it concentrated mainly on enlarging its assets (scale of business).
Vodafone tried to cover Europe by acquiring its own infrastructures because there were
strong demands from Europeans who move around the continent. After Christopher Gent
became CEO, he began to pursue large-scale M&As, such as AirTouch in the US,
Mannesmann in Germany, and J-phone in Japan. The acquisition of Mannesmann was a
hostile takeover, and the deal is the largest ever among M&As in the telecom industry.
Vodafone's global expansion strategy is finance-driven, similar to private equity
funds. It can be said that its expansion strategy was dependent on the CEO's ambition during
the European telecom bubble. Vodafone's management is trying to enhance its share price by
a finance-driven policy. It seeks a balance between its financial scale and financial
productivity, which is measured by the EBITDA margin.
The recent slowdown of growth in the major markets has had impact on Vodafone's
global strategy. Vodafone has shifted its investment target to emerging markets such as India,
which has a high potential for growth. It also decided to sell its Japanese subsidiary, which
was not expected to grow further, to SoftBank in a sale valued at £8.9 billion with a
distribution to shareholders of £6 billion in cash. It is rumored that Vodafone might sell its
share of the U.S. firm, Verizon Wireless, in which it holds a 45% stake, which does not give
Vodafone control. Given such a sale, it would also distribute the gains from the sale to its
shareholders.
I personally like Vodafone's global strategy, which challenges the firm to maximize
its corporate value through itsfinance-driven policy. I think Vodafone's global management
system makes optimal use of its assets and the resources of acquired companies. On the other
hand, I worry about Vodafone's strategy, which is highly dependent on financial issues in the
technology-driven telecommunication business arena. For Vodafone, critical wireless
technologies are supplied by major European manufacturers, such as Nokia and Ericsson,
rather than being developed internally. As already mentioned, the balance between a
technology-driven policy and afinancial-driven policy is important for maximizing the value
of any wireless telecom operator.
CHAPTER 5
Global Investment in Emerging Markets for Sustainable Growth
In this chapter I will discuss global investment as a strategic option for sustainable
growth in a saturated wireless telecom market. As described in Chapter 2, wireless operators
in developed countries cannot expect to grow sustainably if they continue to rely solely on
the existing market, because it has become mature and saturated, and competition is
intensifying. Therefore, DoCoMo, with its technology-driven policy, has begun to implement
a financial business based on a new innovation known as "Mobile Wallet" which is expected
to be a successful new revenue source. In contrast, Vodafone, with itsfinance-driven policy,
is now reassessing its global portfolio.
I believe DoCoMo should consider global investment as another strategic option for
enhancing its corporate value.
5.1 Philosophy
As a first step, DoCoMo must clarify its philosophy for a global investment strategy. I
believe that global investments triggered by today's mature domestic market are very
different from past investments by DoCoMo, which were done mainly to diffuse W-CDMA
and i-mode based on its technology-driven policy. In addition, investments in the operators
who function in the mature markets are undesirable from the viewpoint of risk diversification.
An i-mode alliance among operators at the same level of market maturity (see section 3.3.2),
which DoCoMo has promoted in Europe, is effective without requiring large investments.
Each member of the alliance can enjoy economies of scale, such as joint procurement of
handsets and other equipment.
In my opinion, the possibility of achieving sustainable growth in the future depends
on the quality and quantity of competitive edges that can generate future cash flow. I define
the development capability of advance technologies or innovative business models as a
qualitative competitive edge (technology edge/innovation creativeness). For example, we can
say that DoCoMo's decision to implement an innovative financial service business based on
"Mobile Wallet" already has a qualitative competitive edge for sustainable growth in the
future.
I also define a market that has high potential for growth as a quantitative competitive
edge. For instance, the wireless telecom industry in developed countries has experienced
rapid growth in the past ten years. That growth depended primarily on market potential,
although it was also promoted by the operator's endeavors. Investment in immature markets
that have a high possibility for growth means acquiring the quantitative competitive edge.
Up to this point, DoCoMo's basic strategy has been defined as technology-driven,
while Vodafone's strategy focused on financial matters has been defined asfinance-driven.
As mentioned earlier, entering into a financial service business and expanding its i-mode
alliance are part of DoCoMo's technology-driven policy. Investment in immature markets
with high-growth potential is a strategy based on afinance-driven policy that DoCoMo has
never tried because the market does not need DoCoMo's advanced technology or innovative
business model. Instead, an immature market needs basic products and services for a 2G
platform, since the immature market has not yet advanced to the 3G platform.
With its advanced technological creativity, DoCoMo could maximize its investors'
value by providing technological assistance at every stage of development. I believe that
wireless operators in developed countries should pursue a blended strategy that includes both
the technology-driven policy and thefinance-driven policy in order to maximize the
possibilities for enhancing future corporate value (see Fig. 5.1). In a word, maximization of
corporate value in the wireless telecom industry could be realized by the evolution of both a
qualitative competitive edge and a quantitative competitive edge.
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Figure 5.1 Maximizing corporate value in the wireless telecom industry
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5.2 Methodology
DoCoMo needs to develop a method for acquiring quantitative competitive edges by
investing in immature markets that have high growth potential. Key issues that should be
taken into consideration are:
(1) the growth potential of the wireless telecom market.
(2) government regulation
(3) the country's economic growth, and
(4) country risk factors (economic and political).
It is more effective for DoCoMo to obtain initial investment candidates from emerging Asian
countries because they are geographically and culturally close to Japan.
According to a research report from Business Monitor International, the Asia-Pacific
business environment for the telecommunication industry can be split into three divisions:
* developed markets (Australia, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan);
* emerging markets (Malaysia, India, Philippines, China, Indonesia and Thailand); and
* two least-developed markets (based on penetration rates and regulatory structure:
Pakistan and Vietnam).
A ranking of the telecom industry in Asia-Pacific is shown in Table 5.1. India may be
another option for investment to acquire a quantitative competitive edge because its telecom
market maturity is lowest and its telecom growth potential is highest according to the ranking
table. In fact, India is quite possibly the fastest-growing telecom market, with the highest
potential among Asian emerging countries. India's risk factors (economic risk and political
risk) and its level of government regulation are better than other Asian emerging countries.
However, even if the market is excellent, foreign investors hesitate to invest in the assets of a
Telecom TelecomEconomics - Politics - LT T e Go Competitive Licensing/ Composite Regional
LT risk Risk Environment Regulation Score RankMaturity Potential
Australia 8 (8) 8.5 (8.5) 10(10) 4 (3) 8 (8) 9 (9) 49.5 (47.5) 1(2)
Japan 7 (7) 9 (9) 9 (10) 6 (6) 9 (9) 9 (9) 49 (49) 2(1)
South Korea 8 (7.5) 6 (6.5) 10(9) 5 (4) 8 (8) 9 (9) 46.5 (44.5) 3 (3)
Hong Kong 6 (5) 5.5 (5) 10(10) 3 (3) 9 (9) 10(10) 44.5 (43) 4 (4)
Singapore 8.5 (8.5) 7 (7.5) 9 (8) 3 (2) 8 (8) 8 (8) 43.5 (42) 5 (5)
Taiwan 7.5 (7.5) 7 (6.5) 10(10) 3 (3) 8 (7) 6 (6) 41.5 (40) 6 (6)
Malaysia 7 (5) 5 (5.5) 6 (4) 4 (4) 8 (8) 8 (8) 40 (36.5) 7 (9)
India 6(6.5) 7 (7) 1 (1) 10 (10) 7 (7) 7(7) 38 (38.5) 8(7)
Philippines 5 (5.5) 5.5 (5.5) 2 (2) 8 (8) 8 (9) 7 (7) 35.5 (37) 9 (8)
China 7 (7.5) 4.5 (4.5) 4 (3) 10(10) 5 (4) 4 (4) 34.5 (33) 10(10)
Indonesia 6.5 (5.5) 5 (5) 2 (1) 9 (9) 6 (6) 5 (5) 34.5 (32.5) 10 (11)
Thailand 6.5 (5.5) 6 (6) 3 (3) 6 (5) 5 (5) 6 (6) 34.5 (32.5) 10 (11)
Pakistan 6 (5.5) 4.5 (7) 1 (1) 9 (8) 5 (5) 4 (4) 27 (28) 13(13)
Vietnam 6 (5.5) 4 (4) 2(1) 8 (8) 3 (3) 2 (2) 25 (23.5) 14(14)
Source: Business Monitor International (2006)
Table 5.1 Asia-Pacific business environment ranking for the telecom industry
perceived risky country. India already is the ninth-largest market with the lowest penetration
rate (see Figure 5.2). I believe that India could be a candidate of the quantitative competitive
edge for the wireless operators in the developed countries with mature markets.
(10 million subscribers )
Source: EMC World Cellular Information / NTT DoCoMo (2005)
Figure 5.2 Wireless phone subscribers in the world's top 20 markets
The primary driver of telecom growth in India is consumer demand. However, growth
is also helped by a generally favorable regulatory climate, falling tariffs, and rising finance
among a larger portion of the population. Wireless phone tariffs have fallen rapidly, from a
peak of $0.5 per minute in 2003 to around $0.02 per minute. The Indian telecom market,
especially the wireless sector, has great potential for growth. Earlier in the decade, some
international players, including TeliaSonera and France Telecom did sell, but more recently
strategic investors such as Vodafone, Hutchinson, Telekom Malaysia and Maxis have taken
steps to enter the Indian market.
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5.3 India's Wireless Telecommunication Industry
I have chosen India as a good candidate for global investment for sustainable growth.
I will analyze its market from several perspectives to ascertain whether in fact it is a good
candidate for such investment.
5.3.1 Macroeconomic Forecast
India's economy should continue to exhibit strong growth over the forecast period,
supported by solid gains in manufacturing and a optimistic service sector. The agricultural
sector is also expected to recover after recent relatively weak output. However, downside
risks remain, with escalating oil prices or an outbreak of bird flu both having the potential to
slow growth.
According to 2005 figures, India's economy grew 8% y-o-y in the third quarter of
2005, bringing real GDP growth to 8.1% for the first half of FY 2005, one percentage point
higher than the previous year. Growth in Q3 2005 was largely driven by strong expansion in
the industrial and service sectors, which grew 7.5% and 10.1%, respectively, while the
agricultural sector grew just 2%. With a robust industrial sector, growth in FY 2005 rose to
7.9%, up from 7.0% in FY 2004.
Examining each sector in turn, the industrial sector appears set for strong growth,
largely based on impressive growth in manufacturing, which was up 9.5% in the first half of
FY 2005. With the industrial production index showing an 8.3% increase for the first eight
months of the fiscal year, there is continuing confidence in the outlook for this sector. The
construction boom in south India, driven by the expansion of Indian IT companies, is a
further boon, as the sector slowed in Q3 2005 due to heavy rainfall that affected coal mining
and the decline in crude oil production following an oilfield fire in July. The shortage of coal
caused a slowdown in electricity supply during the same period. With oil prices expected to
remain high, there was some constraint on growth and the industrial sector slowed slightly to
7% in FY 2005, down from 8.2% in FY 2004.
Meanwhile, the service sector continued to make strong contributions to the economy.
In Q3 2005, services contributed 5.5% to GDP growth, led by financial services and
communications, making services the main driver of overall growth. Strong domestic
consumption continued to boost demand for houses, thereby expanding construction activity.
Increasing demand for wireless phones and broadband connections also added to growth in
the communications sector. With stronger world growth expected to sustain high levels of
tourism and raise demand for financial services in the country, growth in the service sector
growth grew 9.9% in FY 2005 from 9.5% the previous year.
Agriculture recovered by the end of FY 2005, despite a relatively weak first half
growth of just 2%. Growth in the agricultural sector fluctuates depending on the weather, and
with the rainfall higher than average during in Q3 2005, agricultural production improved
during the harvest season in Q4 2005. Thus there was growth of 4.1% in FY 2005, up from
0.1% the previous fiscal year.
With sustained growth in services and industry, and a revival in agriculture, it is
expected that growth will remain relatively resilient for the foreseeable future. The service
sector will account for just over half of the expansion, with industry comprising just under
30%, and agriculture just under 20%.
Fiscal Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Population (million) 1,068 1,083 1,098 1,113 1,127 1,141 1,156
Nominal GDP (US$billion) 550 631 737 841 945 1,016 1,082
GDP per capita (US$) 515 583 671 756 839 890 936
Real GDP growth (%) 8.0 7.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Source: Business Monitor International (2006) / Central Statistical Organization of India
Table 5.2 GDP and population forecasts for India
5.3.2 Risk Factors
5.3.2.1 Political Risk
Relations between India's Congress Party and its numerous allies in the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) continue to shape politics in the world's largest democracy
during the forecast period. Dr. Manmohan Singh, an economist who became Prime Minister
in 2004, will need all of his political skills to keep the ruling alliance together. Congress
competes with many of its coalition partners at the state level, and state elections are bound
to strain relations. The UPA will also have to maintain close ties with the Left Front, led by
the Communist Party of India.
5.3.2.2 Economic Risk
The Congress-led government has vowed to continue with the economic
liberalizations of the 1990s. The Indian economy, Asia's fourth largest, grew by 7% during
the year ending March 31, 2005. However, the country's service-led boom has yet to have a
significant effect on raising the living standards of the poor, with more than one-third of
India's one billion-plus population still living on less than one dollar per day. A key task for
the Finance Minister will be to strengthen public finance.
The consolidated fiscal deficit of the central and state governments stands at over 8%
of GDP. Reforms are aimed at boosting revenues, although the planned privatization of
profit-making, state-owned enterprises will face political difficulties.
5.3.2.3 Business Environment Risk
India has a skilled workforce, but its business environment is crippled by excessive
government interference. Foreign investment remains in many sector, with greater
liberalization by the left. Hiring and firing procedures are governed by rigid labor laws under
which companies employing more than 100 people need permission from the chief minister
to lay off staff. Other concerns include: the 670-plus industries reserved for small-scale
procedures; high import tariffs levied on foreign made goods; failing infrastructure,
especially poor power supplies; and a corrupt bureaucracy which must approve permits for
even the most routine tasks. India is working quickly to create Chinese-style "special
economic zones" aimed at overcoming some of these bottlenecks.
5.3.3 Wireless Telecom Market in India
5.3.3.1 Growing Market Trends
A key move in the Indian wireless telecom industry occurred in November 1994
when the government issued eight licenses to eight different companies for wireless phone
services in the four major metropolitan cities of Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, and Calcutta. The
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) reported in November 2004 that wireless
phone services had outstripped fixed-line services. The regulator noted that the country had
44.5 million wireless subscribers and 43.9 million fixed-line subscribers at the end of
October 2004, for a total telephone subscriber base of 88.5 million. The TRAI said almost
25% of the wireless subscriber base, or 11 million subscribers, had been added during the
previous seven months. During the same period, around one million fixed-line subscribers
were added, indicating the comparative pace at which wireless phone service was growing in
India.
India had 77.5 million wireless phone subscribers across the country by the end of
2005, up from 28.5 million a year earlier, after the national subscriber base grew by 58.1% in
2005. A total of 28.4 million wireless phone subscribers were added in 2005, compared with
19.2 million in 2004. GSM operators added 21.1 million subscribers in 2005 to end the year
with 58.5 million subscribers. CDMA operators had 19.0 million subscribers at the end of
2005, up from 11.6 million at the end of 2004 (see Table 5.3).
(as of 12/05)
# of Subscribers Y/Y Growth M/M Growth Market Share
(000) (%) (%) (%)
Bharti 16,327 66.2 5.9 21.1
Reliance Infocomm 13,015 42.8 6.4 16.8
BSNL 14,299 69.5 7.6 18.4
Hutch-Essar 11,413 59.0 6.8 14.7
Tata Tele 3,681 356.7 14.7 4.7
Idea 6,494 37.8 4.2 8.4
Other 12,281 - - 15.9
Total 77,510 58.1 6.8 100.0
Source: AUSPI, COAI, Citigroup Investment Research (2006)
Table 5.3 Indian wireless subscribers
India's wireless sector has grown robustly since competition began in 2004. The
overall subscriber base grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 86% to over 75
million from 0.3 million at the end of FY97 (see Figure 5.3). Morgan Stanley reported that
India's wireless telecom market was expected to grow at a compound average rate of 40%
until 2007. Another industry survey predicted that at least I10 million new wireless phone
subscribers would be added by 2007. The Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI)
also said that the country was well on its way to reaching 250 million fixed and wireless
subscribers by the end of 2007.
The COAI warned that some measures would need to be implemented before this goal could
be achieved, noting that around 80% of the 250 million connections would need to be
wireless. The association believes that to achieve 200 million wireless subscribers by the end
of 2007 it will be necessary to introduce measures, such as shared infrastructure to reduce
costs, a more viable interconnection regime, the removal of obstacles to pre-paid subscriber
acquisition, and the earliest possible introduction of 3G services.
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Figure 5.3 Growth Trend of Indian Wireless phone subscribers
5.3.3.2 Key Drivers of the Wireless Boom
When wireless phones were first introduced, the market was heavily regulated,
license fees were prohibitive, and call charges and handsets were too expensive for all but the
wealthiest people. However, the sector has grown rapidly in the last few years as a result of
spiraling income, and falling prices for licenses, phone tariffs, and handset prices, making it
one of the fastest growing markets in the world. According to Citibank Investment Research,
this growth is driven by four factors that will sustain positive growth.
The first driver of continued high growth in India's wireless phone market is falling
tariffs in a sector where wireless telecom operators are prepared to lose money in order to
keep or win market share and have consequently been fighting a fierce price war. India's
monthly fee is thought to be the lowest in the world: the average per-minute charge for
wireless telecom services fell to 1.20 rupees (US$0.027) by December 2005, compared to
1.90 rupees (US$0.043) the previous quarter (see Figure 5.4). With more than six players
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Figure 5.4 Wireless revenue per minute and subscriber growth in India
competing for market share in most provinces, it is expected that tariffs will continue to slide.
Potential regulatory concessions on license fee revenue share and spectrum fees are key issues, and
revisions in these concessions would be passed on to consumers as lower tariffs.
The second driver is low handset prices, which makes wireless phones more
affordable. Motorola has introduced handsets that are currently retailing for 1,700 rupees
(US$38), and other vendors have new handsets at US$40 or so. Furthermore, India has a
thriving second-hand handset market. Used GSM handsets are available for as little as US$20
in many parts of the country. The trend in handset prices is shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5 Trends in handset prices in India
The third driver is the operators' expanding footprint. Wireless operators have
expanded their footprint significantly over the past two years (see Table 5.4). With the
decline of handset prices and tariffs, affordability has increased, and operators have worked
hard to capture this growth. Bharti, for instance, plans to cover 4,500 towns by March 2006,
more than double its coverage in March 2005. BSNL, Reliance Infocomm, and Hutch-Essar
have also wiidened their coverage (see Table 5.5). Faced with the prospect of subscriber
growth reaching saturation in the larger cities, India's wireless telecom operators are now
eyeing the vast rural market as the next place for boosting wireless phone growth.
FY2004 FY2007 planned
Number Population (million) Number Population (million)
Towns 1,700 out of 5,200 200 5,200 out of 5,200 300
Villages Negligible Negligible 350K out of 607K 450
Source: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India
Table 5.4 Urban and rural wireless coverage plan
FY2005 FY2006-target
Bharti 2,000 4,500
Reliance Infocomm 1,800 5,200
BSNL 800 1,400
Hutch-Essar 2,000 5,000
Tata Tele 200 1,500
Source: Citigroup Investment Research (2006)
Table 5.5 Coverage by wireless operators, by towns
The fourth driver of wireless phone penetration is the prospect of robust economic
growth. It is expected that high GDP growth (see Fig. 5.6) will be driven by nearly double-
digit growth in the services segment and high single-digit industrial growth, as mentioned
previously. This robust economy will drive wireless phone penetration by bringing more
people into the affordability bracket.
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Figure 5.6 Trend of per capita GDP in India (US$)
5.3.3.3 Market Competition
Competition in the Indian wireless market has been intense for the past two years, and
is increasing, with players such as Tata Tele continually expanding its coverage. Five players
(Bharti, BSNL, Reliance, Infocomm, Hutch-Essar and Tata Tele) compete in almost every
province in India. However, given the size of the market, it is likely that each operator can be
profitable despite the intense competition. Four operators (Bharti, BSNL, Reliance,
Infocomm, and Hutch-Essar) currently have over 10 million subscribers each.
As the operators achieve critical mass and scale, the focus is on increasing
profitability. None of the operators appears to be sacrificing market share for profitability,
which is a positive sign for the wireless market. Currently, only five of the 23 circles have
double-digit penetration.
5.3.3.4 Foreign Investors
Large global operators have shown interest in India as a fast-growing markets with
considerable potential. Global operators already in India include SingTel and Hutch, while
newer entrants include Vodafone and Orascom. Vodafone recently took a 10% stake in
Bharti, while Orascom's 19% stake in HTIL gives it an indirect -10% holding in Hutch-
Essar. Meanwhile, Maxis recently announced that it has acquired a stake in Aircel. Other
players such as Telekom Malaysia, SK Telecom, Systema, and Telenor have been reported to
be scouting entry points into the Indian wireless market.
According to Citigroup Investment Research, strategic opportunities exist for three of
the six large operators (see Table 5.6). Bharti and Hutch already have strategic partners.
Moreover, CIR estimates the chances of the Indian government finding a strategic partner in
BSNL are low. Partnerships with Idea Cellular, Tata Teleservices, and Reliance.
Promoter / Foreign partners of Circles of operation Subs (million)
new foreign partner
Bharti Singtel (31%), Vodafone (10%) Low 23 16.3
Hutch-Essar HTIL (45%), Orascom (10%) Low 16 11.4
BSNL Government of India (100%) Low 21 14.3
Reliance Infocomm RCVL (65.25%) Ambani Family (34.75%) Possible 21 13.0
Tata Tele Tata Group (100%) Possible 21 3.7
Idea Biria Group (50%), Tata Group (48%) Possible 8 6.5
Source: Citigroup Investment Research (2006)
Table 5.6 Possibility of foreign partners taking a stack in Indian wireless operators
Infocomm are the only opportunities left for helping foreign telecom majors to gain entry
into the Indian cellular market. If foreign operators fail to gain a foothold into the market
through existing players, their entry would be restricted by spectrum constraints. Already, in
most of the large circles, existing operators face spectrum constraints. Moreover, the
regulator has stated that it would first allocate spectrum to existing players before making it
available to new operators.
5.3.3.5 Regulation of Foreign Investment in the Telecom Sector
In October 2005 the Indian government raised the cap on foreign direct investment in
basic, wireless, and value-added telecommunications services and for global mobile personal
satellite communications-from 49% to 74%. This move was first announced in July 2004
and reiterated in February 2005, but its implementation was deferred owing to opposition
from Leftist partners in the government. To placate these partners, the government said
resident Indians would have to hold at least 26% of shares at all times, that the company's
top management would have to be Indian, that calls made within India could not be routed
through other countries, and that no foreign company could repair or maintain networks
within the country. The 74% cap will include shares held by foreign institutional investors,
non-resident Indians, depository receipts (ADRs and GDRs), foreign currency convertible
bonds, and convertible preference shares. Foreign investment in holding companies will also
be taken into account when calculating the foreign-investment limit. Companies will have to
disclose their holdings half-yearly and certify that foreign investment is within the 74% cap.
Several foreign investors in telecom projects have structured their equity holdings in
joint ventures through holding companies: they own 49% of the joint venture outright and
also own a 49% stake in the Indian joint-venture partner. Telecom investments enjoy tax
incentives as infrastructure projects.
5.4 Summary and Recommendation
Wireless operators in developed countries should pursue a strategy of blending both a
technology-driven policy and afinance-driven policy in order to enhance corporate value in
the future. In other words, the maximization of corporate value in the wireless telecom
industry could be realized by evolving both quantitative competitive edge and quantitative
competitive edge.
As DoCoMo already has Mobile Wallet as its qualitative competitive edge for future
sustainable growth, I believe DoCoMo should invest in immature markets that have high
growth potential in order to acquire a quantitative competitive edge. As explained in Chapter
3, DoCoMo still generates a high level of cash flow, even though its business growth rate
has decelerated. Moreover, accumulated treasury stocks purchased to boost stock market
prices now exceed 5 10 billion. DoCoMo should reinvest these abundant investment
resources effectively to augment and increase its corporate growth.
When selecting candidates, the key issues that are taken into consideration are: (1) the
growth potential of the wireless telecom market; (2) government regulation; (3) the country's
economic growth; and (4) the country risk factors (economic and political).
After I reviewed emerging Asian markets following the above criteria initially, my
strong impression was that India could be an option for investment to acquire the quantitative
competitive edge, because its telecom market maturity is lowest while its telecom growth
potential is highest.
Thereafter, I researched the Indian wireless telecom industry in detail. Indian GDP
continues to grow steadily by around 7%. Such high GDP growth is driven by nearly growth
in the services segment including telecom. The politics and economics of India appear to be
more stable compared with other developing countries, although there are still major country
risk factors. The wireless telecom market has grown rapidly, driven by strong economic
growth and lowering service/product prices, which happened early in the growth period.
As the Indian government remains positive about easing telecom and foreign capital
restrictions, I believe the telecom market will be very attractive to foreign investors. In fact,
global major operators such as Vodafone, SingTel, and Hutchison have already invested in
Indian wireless telecom operators. The Indian wireless telecom market is expected to grow
continually, and the market will be attractive to foreign investors as a result of research and
analysis based on the above four criteria
Although it is my personal opinion, DoCoMo, which has abundant investment
resources, should invest in wireless operators in emerging markets such as India in order to
acquire the quantitative competitive edge and establishing a scheme for obtaining increased
financial return. It would ensure that DoCoMo could grow sustainably and enhance its
corporate value if it acquires the quantitative competitive edge.
If DoCoMo decided to invest in an Indian wireless operator, further research and
analysis would be needed. It is my judgment (based on limited information) that Reliance
Infocomm of Reliance Group, and the government-owned BSNL, would be good candidates
for investment. It is not probable that Bharti, the top operator whose shareholding is owned
by SingTel (31%) and Vodafone (10%) would be candidates. Hutch-Essar, the forth operator
whose 45% shareholding is owned by Hong Kong's Hutchison, will not be a candidate.
There is a problem with Reliance Infocomm, however. It provides digital wireless
telecom service (2G service) by CDMA, which has no affinity with W-CDMA, DoCoMo's
3G standard. However, it could become an investment candidate if it agrees to adopt W-
CDMA in the near future. CIR reported that the chances of the Indian government getting a
strategic partner were low, but the reasons were unclear.
The Indian government is preparing to accept foreign investment in its telecom
industry because it raised the foreign direct investment cap on basic, wireless, and value-
added telecommunications services from 49% to 74%. BSNL provides telecom service to
most of the country except Delhi and Mumbai. MTSL, whose majority shareholder is the
government, covers those two cities. The two operators use GSM that has an affinity with W-
CDMA.
I have developed a scenario for investment in government-owned operators:
(1) Merge MTSL with BSNL,
(2) Spin off wireless phone service; and
(3) Invest in the new wireless operator by foreigners
It will have a positive effect on Indian government finance if stocks are sold to foreign
investors. It is also possible that the government will authorize the merged operator to issue
new shares for financing its future capital expenditures.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Recommendations
I believe that the global wireless telecommunication market is becoming an oligopoly.
In the near future, wireless telecom operators throughout the world will become members of
four major groups.
It has been 22 years since the old AT&T monopoly was split apart in1984, but
recently the U.S. telecommunication industry has reverted back to an oligopoly between two
major operators: new AT&T (Cingular) and Verizon Communications (Verizon Wireless).
Vodafone expanded its global footprint, and recently began to shift its investment
target to emerging markets, such as India, which have high growth potential. Spain's
Telef6nica, which already owns operators with high potential growth in Latin America,
acquired 02, a British wireless operator that was spun off from British Telecom. Telef6nica
added other markets in the UK, Ireland, and Germany through acquisition. As a result of
these acquisitions, it is clear that the European telecommunication industry has also become
an oligopoly on the initiative of three major operators-UK's Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom
(T-mobile), and Spain's Telef6nica.
It is also clear that in Asia, China's mobile industry is the largest operator in the
world based on number of subscribers. However, Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communication gave licenses to new entrant in the Japanese wireless telecom market, flying
in the face of the current global trend toward oligopoly.
In my opinion, the two U.S. operators, the three European ones, one Chinese, and
Japan's NTT DoCoMo, will lead the global market toward oligopoly. In particular, operators
in advanced countries that are becoming saturated will seek to maintain or increase
sustainable growth and to secure positions comparable to the global major operators by
expanding their scale of economy or acquiring new growth markets.
Share price is the generally accepted standard by which to measure a company's
sustainable future growth. Stock price is theoretically decided by net present value (NPV) of
free cash flow that a company or an asset generates. Free cash flow should keep expanding at
a certain fixed rate in order to improve corporate value, according to assumptions of stock
pricing theory. Perpetual growth of free cash flow is decided depending on the quality and
quantity of its competitive edges, as described in Chapter 5.
Although I explained that Vodafone's basic strategy focuses on acquiring a
quantitative competitive edge that depends on its finance-driven policy, other major
operators' growth strategies focus on securing a quantitative competitive edge. They have
never focused on a technology-driven policy for basic growth. It is common that major global
operators have committed their research and development to manufacturers and concentrate
on developing strategies for their business expansion.
On the other hand, DoCoMo has maintained its growth by continually developing
competitive-edge technologies and creative innovations, such as wireless Internet service (i-
mode), 3G standardization (W-CDMA), and Mobile Wallet service-in other words,
accumulating a qualitative competitive edge that depends on a technology-driven policy.
Furthermore, DoCoMo developed its basic strategy of global investment to focus on
expanding i-mode and W-CDMA to as many overseas wireless telecom operators as possible.
DoCoMo's growth strategy is an exception in the global telecom industry. In the wireless
telecom industry that is becoming an oligopoly and is expected to form into four major
groups in the future, if DoCoMo wants to lead one of the groups, the following would be
presumptions: (1) maintain sustainable growth, (2) become more influential in the global
wireless telecom market and (3) maintain its technology/innovation creativity.
DoCoMo has faced slow growth in its business because the Japanese market is nearly
saturated and tariff reduction battles occur repeatedly among competitors. However,
DoCoMo still has the resources to generate more than ¥600 billion in free cash flow, and
accumulated treasury stocks that have been purchased to boost stock market prices now
exceed5 510 billion. However, institutional investors are not satisfied with DoCoMo's capital
management policy, and they question whether DoCoMo is using its investment resources
effectively. Although DoCoMo invested in both domestic and foreign assets in 2005 and
2006, the amount of each investment is small compared with its capital power. DoCoMo
should reinvest its abundant investment resources effectively to increase its corporate growth
and influence in the global wireless telecom industry. Such investments would secure the
company's position as a global major operator.
Previously I stated that DoCoMo's growth strategy would be exceptional in the global
telecom industry. I believe that DoCoMo should develop a global investment strategy based
on afinance-driven policy by immediately putting to use its abundant capital resources. Such
a strategy is based on a philosophy and methodology totally different from DoCoMo's prior
investment strategies.
Emerging countries with high economic growth potential and established political and
economic systems are the most likely candidates for a finance-driven investment strategy. In
Chapter 5 I discussed an investment strategy for the emerging market in India, which I
believe would be the one of the best candidates for DoCoMo's growth strategy. I have
stressed repeatedly in this thesis that a balance between a technology-driven policy and a
finance-driven policy is an indispensable part of the growth strategy of wireless telecom
operators. I believe that wireless operators in developed countries should blend both policies
in order to maximize every possibility of enhancing corporate value in the future. In other
words, the maximization of corporate value in the wireless telecom industry can be realized
by evolving both a qualitative competitive edge and a quantitative competitive edge.
I believe DoCoMo is uniquely able to exercise such a blending strategy among the
global wireless telecom giants because it has both the technology/innovation creativeness and
abundant capital resources. This blending strategy will bring DoCoMo sustainable growth for
the future. Furthermore, investors and other stakeholders expect that DoCoMo will
implement such a strategy.
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